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The promulgation of uniform title standards,' the judicial adoption
of the "civil law rule" relative to nonconsumptive uses of owners abutting
a nonnavigable lake,2 the assertion of priority of a federal tax lien over a
mechanic's lien earlier in point of time under Florida law,3 and the
acceptance of the American viewpoint that options in leases do not violate
the Rule Against Perpetuities, 4 were some of the highlights in the ever
developing Florida law of Real Property during the period of this survey.5
Estates by the entireties" and the Florida homestead7 continued to be a
prolific source of litigation. The courts recognized, at least sub silento,
an easement in gross and the transferability of such an easement,8 and
there were also important decisions relative to submerged sovereignty landY
The style of this article follows that of previous survey articles, with
the subject matter being divided into seven principal headings:
I. Vendor and Purchaser
II. Deeds- Description, Parties, Recording
III. Estates, Dower, Homestead and Future Interests
IV. Rights In Land
V. Special Titles
VI. Mechanics' Liens and Mortgages
VII. Landlord and Tenant
No special section is provided to discuss new legislation as that material
is incorporated into the principal divisions listed above with the word
* Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Miami.
1. See text accompanying notes 10-12 infra.
2. See text accompanying notes 202-203 infra.
3. See text accompanying notes 308-314 infra.
4. See text accompanying notes 130-133 infra.
5. The material, subject to a few exceptions, includes the cases reported in
97 So.2d (1957), through 112 So.2d (1959), and the enactments of the 1959 legislature.
Owing to the large number of decisions and the breadth of the subject matter, some
selection in the presentation of the material was found necessary. This article represents
a rather large selection, but it is expected, if the growing trend continues, that even
more selection will be necessary in the future. Zoning cases are excluded.
6. See text accompanying notes 108-12; infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 141-158 infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 191-196 infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 214-224 infra.
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Legislation appearing in the appropriate subheading. Access to particular
material is provided by the generous',use of headings and subheadings.
T. VENDOR AND PURCHASER
Introduction. This article deals only with those problems of the vendor
and purchaser relationship that are peculiar to land transactions. Usual
questions concerning the inception of the relationship or the formation of
the contract are omitted. Thus, matters of offer and acceptance, the
sufficiency of the terms and conditions, and similar items applicable to
contracts generally are omitted in deference to the companion article on
Contracts. Similarly, questions concerning brokers' commissions are excluded
in favor of treatment in the Contracts article.
Marketable Title and Title Standards. The promulgation and publica-
tion of uniform title standards by the Real Property, Trust and Probate
Section of the Florida Bar was one of the most significant developments
in this area during the past biennium."' These standards, although voluntary
and not having the force and effect of law," are nevertheless expected to
result in a high degree of uniformity of treatment in the every day disposition
of frequently recurring problems concerning the marketability of titles.
Common defects of title, real or apparent, are delineated in the standards.
Then, a conclusion, bolstered by cited authority, is reached as to the
validity of the resultant title.
Thus, there is provided an available standard for an examining
attorney to base his decision, and, a common ground is afforded opposing
attorneys for negotiation and the reconciliation of differences. Since the
standards arc voluntary rather than formally enacted legislation, revisions
can be readily made to accommodate new decisions and legislative changes. 12
Sales Contracts, Necessity of Witnesses. The formalities required for
the proper execution of a sales contract have been the subject of a number
of cases in recent years. It now appears to be well established that for a
sales contract executed by a single male vendor involving non-homestead
property, compliance with the Statute of Frauds, section 725.01, only need
10. The standards were first published in the March, 1959, Supplement to the
Florida Bar journal. They are reprinted in BOYE,, FLORIDA R,AL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
. 14.15 (1959).
11. A voluntary standard has been defined as "a voluntary agreement, uniform
in nature, either statutory or decision, to be used by the examiner, in considering
whether or not the evidence of title under consideration, supplies the quantity and
quality of title required in that particular instance." Carmichael, Florida Title
Standards-Why?, 31 FLA. B.I. 133, 135-136 (1957). It has also been defined as"a voluntary agreement made in advance by members of the Bar on the manner of
treating a particular title problem when and if it arises." Catsman, Uniform Title
Standards, Foreword, 33 FLA. B.J. 221 (1959).
A legislative standard, on the other hand, is a standard duly enacted into law.
See Carmichael, supra at 135.
12. See 33 FLA. B.J. 1105-1111 (1959), for revised standards 12.3, 12.4 and 13.1.
These revisions are incorporated in the standards reprinted in BOYER, op. cit. supra
note 10.
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be satisfied.'a This sinply requires a sufficient writing or memorandum
signed by the party sought to be charged. For contracts involving the
sale of homesteads,14 the separate property of a married woman, 15 the
interest of a married woman in an estate by the entireties,' 6 and the
relinquishment of dower, 7 however, the contract must conform also to the
statute regulating the conveyance of real property, namely section 689.01.
The court has construed applicable constitutional 8 and statutory 9 provi-
sions as requiring such contracts to be witnessed. Thus, in these instances,
part performance of an oral contract will not be a sufficient predicate
for a decree of specific performance. 2 Although most of the cases involved
the question of specific performance, it would appear that such defectively
executed contracts would be null and void and unenforceable in any
action. 21 Thus, as a practical matter, except where the vendor is a single
male selling non-homestead property, the contract must be signed in the
presence of two witnesses to be valid.
Statute of Frauds; Agency. Except in those instances delineated
above requiring witnesses to contracts for the sale of realty, equity will
enforce oral contracts for the conveyance of real estate on the basis of part
perfornane 2. ' Similarly, it will enforce paroI gifts of land under certain
circumstances. These circumstances were again delineated in a recent case 23
which stated that a parol gift will be enforced when the donee can furnish
conclusivc proof (1) of the gift; (2) of possession taken in reliance on
the gift; and (3) that the donee made permanent and valuable improve-
ments on the faith of the gift with the donor's acquiescence.
2 4
In a suit for specific perfonrance brought by a married woman and
her husband for the conveyance of the wife's property, it was held that
the fact that the wife did not sign the sales contract did not prevent
13. Zimmerman v. Diedrich, 97 So.2d 120 (FIa. 1957); Leute v. Clark, 22 Fla.
515 (1886).
14. Petersen v. Brornan, 100 So.2d 821 (la. App.) (dictum), cert. denied,
104 So.2d 594 (Fla. 1958); Zimmerman v. Diedrich, supra note 13. Sec BoYrER, op. cit.
supra note 10, at 27 n. 11.
I . Petersen v, Brotman. spTra note 14; Zimmernan v. Dicdrich, sunpra note 13.
16. NVexler v. Griffith, 107 So.2d 147 (Fla. App. 1958), cert. denied, 109 So.2d
573 (Fla. 1959); Petersen v. Brotman, snpra note 14.
17. Lindgren v. Van fleet, 101 So.2d 155 (Fla. App. 1958), reversed as to
application of the principle but not the principle itself, 107 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1958),
reversed on other grounds, 112 So.2d 881 (Fla. App. 1959); Petersen v. Brotnan,
supra note 14; Zimmerman v. Diedrich, supra note 13.
18. FLA. Coxs'r. art. X, §§ I and 4, as to homesteads; art. XI, § 1, as to
separate property of a married woman.
19. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 689.01, 708.07 (1957).
20. Cases cited notes 14-17 supra.
21. Wexler v. Griffith, 107 So.2d 147 (Fla. App. 1958), cert. denied, 109 So.2d
573 (H7a. 1959), affirming a decree that an unwitnessed contract to convey executed
by tenants by the entireties was null and void.
22, See generally, BOYER, FLORTnA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 1.03 (1959).
23. Binz v. Helvetia Fla. Enterprises, 104 So.2d 124 (Fla. App. 1958),




enforcement of the contract since her joining in the suit showed a
ratification of the husband's agency and amounted to an offer of perform-
ance, thus creating. mutuality of remedy at that time.
25
Specific Performance; Damages, Liquidated and Otherwise. Some of
the differences between legal and equitable remedies generally, and particu-
larly the differences between an action for specific performance and an
action for damages, were depicted in the case of Miller v. Rolfe. 26 In this
case the vendors brought suit against the vendees for specific performance.
After the suit was filed, but before trial, the vendors voluntarily conveyed
to a third party. Under these circumstances, it was held error for the trial
court to retain jurisdiction and grant damages as incidental relief. Since
the vendors had conveyed, they were no longer in a position to perform,
and the equity court was divested of jurisdiction since it no longer could
grant specific performance. Thereupon, the vendees were entitled to have
the question of damages determined by a jury in a court of law if they so
desired.2
T
The problem of the enforceability of provisions for liquidated damages
was again considered in the case of O'Neill v. Broadview, Inc.2 8 In this
case a contract provision calling for the forfeiture of a down payment of
$1,500 when the total purchase price was $10,400 was enforced. The court
stated that the amount was not sufficient to shock the conscience of
the chancellor, 29 and therefore, the case was controlled by Beatty v.
Flannery'0 and not by Haas v. Crisp Realty Company.31
The vendors are not entitled to recover from a defaulting vendee "a
deposit" provided for in the contract but never actually made.32 In such
a case, the vendors may sue for actual damages and may have the cause
25. Williams v. Noel, 105 So.2d 901 (Fla. App. 1958), rehearing denied with
opinion, 112 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1959).
26. 97 So.2d 132 (Fla. App. 1957).
27. Ibid. The case may also be an application of the principle that one who seeks
equity must do equity. Since the plaintiffs were the ones who prevented the equitable
relief sought, they were not entitled to any relief. Ilad the action been by the vendees
against the vendors for specific performance, and the vendors prevented such relief by a
voluntary conveyance, the equity court could retain jurisdiction and grant damages. See
the above case, 97 So.2d 132 at 134-135; Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Safford Bros.
Produce Co., 121 Fla. 833, 164 So. 681 (1935).
28. 112 So.2d 280 (Fla. App. 1959). See also note 29 infra.
29. The general rule is that provisions for liquidated damages will be enforced
whereas penalty provisions will not. However, the rule that a purchaser in default is not
entitled to recover money paid his vendor is also frequently applied except in cases of
fraud or fortuitous misfortunes which would give the vendor a benefit shocking to the
courts's conscience. These rules, along with the cases cited in the next two footnotes
and others, are discussed in more detail in Boyer, Survey of Real Prop5erty Law, 8
MIAMI L.Q. 389, 390-392 (1954); and in BoYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTArE TRANSACTIMNS
48-49 (1959).
30. 49 So.2d 81 (Fla. 1951). See also note 29 supra.
31. 65 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1953). See also note 29 supra.
32. Brown v. Fine, 102 So.2d 830 (Fla. App. 1958).
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transferred to the appropriate court having jurisdiction over the amount
claimed.A,
The discretionary nature of specific performance was the basis for
the decision in Mayer v. Willig,34 the final result of which was tantamount
to a decree of rescission. In this case the contract described the land as
containing approximatcly 58 acres and provided for a price adjustment in
the event of a discrepancy" in the size of the tract. The land was bordered
on the north by a river, and the dispute concerned the amount of acreage,
the vendor asserting that the payment should be for 58 acres while the
vendee claimed that it should be for only 44, making a difference of
approximately $10,000. Under these circumstances, the court concluded that
the chancellor was warranted in denying specific performance, but found
that there was no satisfactory basis for the forfeiture of the deposit and
concluded that it should be returned.
The recovery of an additional sum paid by the vendee to induce the
vendor to complete the transaction after the vendor's refusal has been
allowed on the basis of statutory provisions. In Lord v. Die Polder,38 there
was a brief written agreement and complete payment by the vendee of the
$10,000 stipulated. Then the vendor refused to deliver a deed, and the vendee
eventually agreed to pay an additional $5,000. After delivery of the deed,
the vendee was allowed to recover the additional $5,000 paid to induce
performance. The court stated that the defense of a voluntary payment
would have been valid except for the statute 8 prohibiting such a defense
when pursuant to a contract there is no enforceable obligation to make it.81
The amount of damages recoverable by a vendee for breach of a
contract to convey depends upon the good or bad faith of the breaching
vendor,38 and this principle was reaffirmed in Gassner v. Lockett." It was
reasserted that where the breach is not occasioned by bad faith (in the
particular instance it was caused by senility and forgetfulness), the proper
measure of damages is the recovery of any purchase money paid, together
with interest and expenses of investigating title, and any profit made by
the vendor as a result of the subsequent sale. In case of a bad faith
breach, or in case the vendor had no title but was acting on the supposition
33. Ibid.
34. 104 So.2d 675 (Fla. App. 1958).
35. 113 So.2d 440 (Fla. App. 1959).
36. FLA, STAT. § 52.24 (1957).
37. Lord v. Die Polder, supra note 35.
38. The rule is referred to in BOYER. FLORIA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIO s 312
(1959), in discussing Eaton v. lHopkins, 71 Fla. 615, 71 So. 922 (1916), involving
breach of warranty and authorizing, contrary to the usual rule, recovery of the loss of
bargain where the grantor's breach consisted of his subsequent conveyance to a bona fide
purchaser for value who prevailed under the recording act.
39. 101 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1958).
[VOL. XIV
REAL PROPERTY
that he might acquire title, then lie is liable for the value of the land
at the time of the breach with interest from that date.
40
Provisions Construed; Questions of Performance. A number of cases
concerned the construction of particular provisions, and are worthy of note.
In Kubicek v. Way,41 the contract contained two provisions concerning the
effect of the vendor's inability to convey at the time of performance. The
one clause was the more or less usual provision calling for a marketable
title and giving the vendor an additional 120 days to cure the defects,
and upon his inability to do so, affording the vendee the option of
demanding the return of his money and terminating the contract. The
other provision was inserted at the insistence of the vendor and provided
that upon the seller's inability to "deliver title" within the time specified,
then the deposit should be returned and the contract rendered void.
The contract called for the conveyance of 600 acres. The vendor,
not owning 60 acres of that described in the contract, and being unable
to acquire it, sought to return the deposit. The land had increased in
value, however, and the vendee brought an action for specific performance.
The court resolved the dispute by deciding for whose benefit the above
respective clauses were inserted.
It was decided that the first of the above clauses, giving the vendee
an option to rescind should the vendor be unable to convey a marketable
title, was for the benefit of the vendee. Thus, the vendee can waive any
defects and elect to take whatever title the vendor has. This is in accord
with the usual interpretation,42 as to hold otherwise would allow a
defaulting vendor to take advantage of his own breach of not being able
to furnish a marketable title. The court then concluded that the second
clause for voiding the contract if the seller "is unable to deliver title"
was inserted for the benefit of the seller, and thus he could take
advantage of it as to the sixty acres. The court did not stress the distinction
between an unmerchantable or unmarketable title and no title, but the
two clauses are so worded, and by thus construing them, they can be
reconciled and the decision of the court sustained. The decision was that
the vendee had a right to specific performance of that land to which the
vendor had title (the first clause being inserted for the benefit of the
vendee), but that he had no action for breach of contract as to the
sixty acres to which the vendor had no title (that clause being inserted
for the benefit of the vendor), and therefore he was not entitled to
damages."
40. Gassner v. Lockett, supro note 39. The damage recoverable in this instance is
apparentlv the loss 6f the vendee's bargain. lence, from the value of the land at the
time of the breach, presumably there should be deducted the amount still owing on
the purchase price.
41. 102 So.2d 173 (Fla. App. 1958).
42. BOYER, oP. cit. supra note 10, at 223-224.
43. Kubicek v. Way, 102 So.2d 173 (Fla. App. 1958).
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Provisions in a contract specifying that the sellers would secure a
release of a right of redemption from the United States, or fully indemnify
the buyer from all damages resulting therefrom, and to convey by general
warranty deed free from all incumbrances required judicial construction in
Suncoast Building of St. Petersburg v. Russell,44 At the closing, the sellers
tendered a deed conveying the land subject to the right of redemption
but containing also a clause to the effect that the sellers would warrant and
guarantee to save the grantee harmless from all damages which might
accrue from the exercise of such a right of redemption. In a suit by the
vendee's assignee against the seller for return of the deposit and damages,
a summary judgment for the defendant was rendered. This was affirmed
on appeal, the court concluding that the provision in the contract afforded
the sellers an alternative method of performance, that is, by either securing
a release or by indemnifying the buyer.", That the seller chose the latter
method gave no cause of action to the grantee. The conclusion seems
sound from the legal viewpoint, although pragmatically the contract of
indemnity may be worth considerably less to the grantee than the release
and perfected title. This, however, is not the fault of the court; the vendee
should not have consented to this provision if it was not satisfactory to
him when the contract was made, and the assignee, of course, is likewise
limited to tile terms of the contract.
Parties, of course, may waive their rights under contracts, and this,
in effect, is what occurred in the case of Country Life Construction Corp.
v. MacCormack.'6 At the time of the closing, the vendor did not have
title to a specified tract and, although at this time the vendee could have
rescinded, nevertheless he went ahead with the transaction. The particular
tract in question was to be purchased from the city, but before the city
would convey, certain improvements had to be made. At the closing, the
parties further agreed that if the purchaser could not thereafter obtain
title to the particular tract, the transaction could be rescinded. The vendee
went into possession and began making improvements. In a later action for
rescission brought by the purchaser, a decree for the defendants was affirmed.
Te court concluded that the agreement made at the time of the closing
envisioned that the purchaser should have the duty of securing title to
the particular strip, and that there was no showing that he was unable to
secure the land, the evidence, in fact, suggesting that he could have secured
it since the town had offered an extension of the original agreement. 47
Voidable Contracts; Fraud and Incompetency. Contracts entered into
because of fraudulent misrepresentations are, of course, voidable, but there
44. 105 So.2d 809 (fla. App. 1958).
45. Suncoast Bldg. of St. Petersburg v. Russell, supra note 44.
46. 107 So.2d 763 (Fla. App. 1958).
47. County Life Constr. Corp. v. MacConnack, supra note 46.
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still remains a considerable amount of caveat emptor in Florida cases 48
dealing with a vendee's right to rescind a realty transaction because of
fraud. Fraud is never presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence.4 9 Further, in order to justify rescission, the complaining party,
usually the vendee, must show, among other things, not only that he relied
on the misrepresentations but also that he was justified in so relying. This
factor of justifiable reliance has been the crucial issue in several cases
during the period of this survey. A frequently recurring situation involves
exaggeration of the amount of profits being realized from the operation
of business property which is the subject of sale.50 The rule in Florida,
reaffirmed in Welbourn v. Cohen,5' seems to be well established that as
long as the vendor does not prevent an independent investigation and
the parties are dealing at arm's length, the purchaser is not justified in
relying on such statements and cannot predicate an action to rescind thereon.
In the Welbourn case the circumstances were such that the purchaser was
aware that some of the statements in the prospectus were not as repre-
sented, 12 he 'was also advised to investigate further, 3 and in fact he did
engage an accountant to make an examination of the seller's books.54 Thus,
he could not rescind.
The principle of unjustifiable reliance was also significant in Sutton
v. Crane.55 In this case, the vendee, unable to read because of poor eyesight,
relied on the vendor's reading the contract to him, and then later, aware
of previous misrepresentations by the vendor, entered into an amended
contract, without independent advice, specifically confirming the first one.
Thus, the vendee's action for rescission was denied.
Deeds and contracts by mental incompetents not under guardianship
are also voidable, 6 but in granting relief the chancellor will endeavor to
reach the most equitable result. This was illustrated in the case of Abshier v.
Etter," in which certain instruments were cancelled and the transactions
rescinded, but as to a transaction involving a shopping center under
construction by the defendant, financed by a large institutional mortgage,
the chancellor decreed the incompetent to be owner of an undivided one
48. In addition to the cases cited herein, see those cited in the previous surveys:
12 U. Mrnnm L. REV. 499, 503; 10 MIAMI L.Q. 389, 396 (1956); 8 MIAMi L.Q. 389,
396 (1954).
49. Welboum v. Cohen, 104 So.2d 380 (Fla. App. 1958), citing many Florida cases.
50. For additional cases see the articles cited in note 48 supra.
51. 104 So.2d 380 (Fla. App. 1958).
52. On a visit to the premises, the vendee ascertained, for example, that one
building was not 90 x 90 ft. as represented but was in fact only 20 x 20 ft.
53. This was the advice of his attorney.
54. The seller did not provide the accountant with an accounts payable ledger, but
the accountant was advised to call the oil distributing company from which lie could
have ascertained the extent of the vendor's sales. The call was never made.
-. 55. 101 So.2dU23 (Fla. App. 1958).
56. Deeds by ani insane person under guardianship are generally held void. BoYER,
FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANACTIONS § 10.04 (1959), particularly at pp. 169-170.
57. 102 So.2d 853 (Fla. App. 1958).
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half interest subject to the mortgage, and impressed a lien on the other
'half to secure the payment of $10,000. The decision was affirmed, the
court concluding that the decree resulted in no unjust enrichment to
either party.59
The case of Baroudi v. Hales5 involved the right to rescind of an incom-
petent vendee. The vendee entered into the contract during a lucid interval
and a restoration, " but he was again adjudged incompetent prior to the time
of performance. Time was of the essence and the downpaynient was to be
forfeited in case of nonperformance. Eight months later the curator offered
to close, and then brought suit for rescission and recovery of the down
payment on the vendor's refusal. Since time was of the essence, no further
notice was necessary after nonperformance in order to put the purchaser
in default. Since there was no showing that the incompetency made the
vendee unable to perform, and in fact no showing of inability to close
at all, the inference arising from the belated tender suggesting, rather,
quite the contrary, the defaulting vendee was entitled to no relief.61
Legislation. It may be noted that 1959 legislation has provided for
automatic restoration of competency under certain conditions. 2
Prorations. In Gelb v. Aronovitz,6 3 prorations at the closing were made
on the basis of the taxes for the previous year. After current taxes were
levied at a considerably higher figure, the purchaser brought suit against
the vendor for his prorata contribution of the additional taxes. The court
held that it was error to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss, and that
the purchaser may be entitled to such sums, but it did not foreclose the
possibility of the defense of an accord and satisfaction on trial of the cause.
Options; Time of the Essence. Although time is not considered of the
essence in equity unless specifically so provided in cases involving contracts
to convey realty,6 ' the rule is otherwise as to options. Time is of the
essence in option contracts both in law and equity whether specifically
so provided or not. Generally, an optionee must conform to the exact terms
and conditions specified as to the time and manner of exercising options.
Noncompliance with the terms specified for the exercise of the option on
or before its expiration date results in its loss although the parties may be
negotiating for an extension or modification at that time.0
58. Abshier v. Etter, supra note 57.
59. 98 So.2d 515 (Fla. App. 1957).
60. Transactions during lucid intervals where there is no guardianship are generally
valid since the competency at the time of the transaction determines its validity and not
the competency at other timts. See BoYr.a, op. cit. supra note 56 at 170-171.
61. Baroudi v. 11ales, 98 So.2d 515 (Fla. App. 1957).
62. la. Laws 1959, ch. 59.155, amending FIA. STAT. § 394.22 (1957). "
63. 98 So.2d 375 (FIa. App. 1957).
64. BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE 'ERANSACTIONS § 4,04 (.1959).
65. Mathews v. Kingsley, 100 So.Zd 445 (Fla. App. 1958).
66. 1bid.
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IT. DEEDS - DESCRIPTION, PARTIES, RECORDING
Description; Legislation. Chapter 59-375 of the 1959 Florida Acts
provides that the word "minerals" in any deed, lease or written contract
shall be construed to exclude topsoil, muck, peat, humus, sand and common
clay unless otherwise expressly provided.
Description; Sufficiency. It is axiomatic that a deed to be effective
must adequately describe the parcel of land to be conveyed.07 The descrip-
tion is inadequate when a surveyor on the basis of the information contained
in the deed cannot point to any parcel as being the one intended, and
the deed is therefore a nullity.08 Conveyances in reference to a plat
incorporate the courses and distances of the plat by reference,60 but if the
plat does not make the description sufficiently definite, the deed is not
aided thereby. Further, extrinsic evidence may be used to explain a latent
ambiguity but not a patent ambiguity."" Thus, where the deed did not
contain the section, range and township number, and the plat to which
it referred contained over 100 tracts of the same number, the deed was
a nullity.71
Accretion and Reliction. The general principles of accretion and relic-
tion were reaffirmed in several decisions during the period of this survey.
Thus, in Mexico Beach Corporation v. St. Joe Paper Conpany72 the question
arose as to the ownership of alluvial land. According to the original
government survey, the particular fractional section consisted of 624.23
acres and was bordered by the Gulf of Mexico. This land was conveyed
to the State of Florida by patent and later conveyed by the state to
private individuals. All of the conveyances simply referred to the land
as the designated section or fractional section. In the course of time alluvial
deposits were sufficient not only to fill in a complete section but also to
leave a considerable amount of excess land. The court held that since the
state did not survey and designate or otherwise identify and except alluvial
land formed after the original survey, the conveyance by the state and the
subsequent conveyances passed title to all the land, including the alluvial,
to the edgewaters of the Gulf of Mexico.73
67. For a general and more complete discussion of land description and disputed
boundaries, see BOYER, FLORIDA REAl. ESTATE TRANSACTION, ch. 13 (1959).
68. Connelly v. Smith, 97 So.2d 865 (Fla. App. 1957), cert. denied, 101 So.2d 811
(Fla. 1958).
69. Bishop v. Johnson, 100 So.2d 817 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 104 So.2d
596 (Fla. 1958); Connelly v. Smith, supra note 68.
70. Connelly v. Smith, supra note 68.
71. Ibid.
72. 97 So.2d 708 (Fla. App. 1957), cert. denied, 101 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1958).
73. Ibid. See also Paxson v. Collins, 100 So.2d 672 (Fla. App. 1958), also recog-
nizing the right of abutting owners to accreted lands. This case also held that in a suit
for quiet title and an injunction against the Trustees of the Intcrnal Improvement Fuid
where it was alleged that the Trustees had granted an easement over acereted land, the
proper venue of the suit was the county in which the land was located.
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A similar problem relating to relicted lands7 ' and also involving
the proposition that a conveyance in reference to monuments having width
carries title to the center of the monument was involved in Feig v. Graves."1
In this case the conveyance was in reference to a plat, and the plaintiff's
land was separated from a lakeshore by a "walkway." It was held that
when the lake rccedecd, the plaintiff's title continued to extend to the
center of the walkway with his implied easement76 of access to the waters
likewise extending over the balance of the walkway, including the relicted
lands.
A number of other important cases involving land titles and water
arose during this period. Lopez v. Smith" is noted at this time, and the
others in other sections of this article.78 In this case, a number of well
settled principles were reaffirmed: (1) a meander line ordinarily does
not constitute the boundary of land bordering on navigable waters although
it may be made the boundary where so intended or where the discrepancy
between the meander line and the ordinary high water line leaves an
excess of unsurveyed land so great as to indicate clearly and palpably fraud
or mistake; (2) ordinarily the high water mark and not the meander line
constitutes the boundary to land bordering navigable waters; (3) navigable
waters do not extend to all waters merely because they are affected by
the tides; and (4) the test of navigable water is its capacity for navigation
and not its usage for that purpose.' 9
Disputed Boundaries; Resurveys; Adverse Possession; Acquiescence and
Estoppel. The general rule that the original survey controls when there
is a conflict between it and a resurvey was reaffirmed in Bishop v. Johnson.80
This rule as to conflicting surveys, however, has been held during the same
period inapplicable to sovereignty land underlying navigable waters.81
The doctrines of acquiescence and estoppel as to the location of
boundaries were reaffirmed. Under Florida law, for the principle of
acquiescence to apply, there must have been a dispute or at least uncertainty
as to the location of the boundary prior to its establishment and
acquiescence. Principles of estoppel may be applied in defense of a title
but not to establish one. Further, the same case 2 applied and clarified
74. Alluvial or accreted land refers to that which was built up by gradual or
imperceptible deposits; relicted land refers to that which was formerly covered by water
but which became dry land by the imperceptible recession of the water.
75. 100 So.2d 192 (Fla. App. 1958). See also the discussion of this case and two
others in the text accompanying notes 242-246 infra.
76. See also text, Easements by implication, following note 174 infra.
77. 109 So.2d 176 (Fla. App. 1959).
78. See text, Water Rights, following note 197 infra.
79. Lopez v. Smith, note 77 supra.
80. 100 So.2d 817 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 104 So.2d 596 (Fla. 1958).
Accord. Wildeboer v. Flack, 97 SoZd 29 (Fla. App. 1957).
81. See Ruyle v. Dolly, 110 So.Zd 467 ( Ma. App. 1959). See also text, Submerged
Sovereignty Land, following note 213 infra.
82. Blackburn v. West Coast Land and Dev. Co., 109 So.Zd 413 (F7a. App.),
cert. denied, 114 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1959).
REAL PROPERTY
the doctrines of adverse possession to such disputes. It was held that an
encroacher could not acquire title by adverse possession under present
statutes unless he complied with the requirements for adverse possession
without color of title. 3 Specifically, that requires a return of the disputed
strip for tax purposes and thereafter the payment of taxes annually on
such land. The suggestion that fencing the disputed strip in with the
adjacent land constitutes color of title to the encroached area so that
one can acquire title by adverse possession by complying with those statutes
was rejected.8 5 This position seems sound as otherwise the legislative intent
would appear to be thwarted.'8
Delivery. It is elementary that a deed or other instrument must be
delivered to be effective' and a true escrow delivery passes no title until
the happening of the condition.87 Thus, a lease delivered in escrow but
which never became effective was a nullity, and an architect attempting
to assert a lien against the fee as a result of a contract with the anticipated
lessee was unsuccessful.88 The instrument, of course, is effective or not as
of delivery; thus a subsequent interlineation to correct the legal description
and a re-recording by the grantee has no effect, 9 and the deed originally
invalid because of defective description remains a nullity. The admissibility
of parol evidence to show a condition precedent and that the instrument
never became operative was reaffirmed in a case involving a sales contract,
the court indicating that if the proposed vendee could prove the parol
condition, he would be entitled to a return of the purchase money. 0
Parties to Deeds; Legislation. That a deed in which the name of the
grantee is left blank is ineffective to convey title was reaffirmed in a case
involving a claimed satisfaction of a mortgage by merger.9' The merger
principle was recognized but not applied because of the ineffectiveness
of the uncompleted blank deed. 2 The most significant developments
concerning parties to deeds, however, occurred in the field of legislation.
83. Adverse possession without color of title is governed by FL.A. SmrT. §§ 95.18 and
95.19 (1957). See also Lykes Bros. v. Brautcheck, 106 So.2d 582 (Fla. App. 1958),
holding that where plaintiff had acquired title by actual adverse possession in a disputed
boundary situation prior to 1939, his failure to return the land thereafter for taxes and
to pay the taxes resulted in his loss of title to the adjoining landowner claiming under
a tax deed pursuant to a 1945 tax foreclosure suit embracing the land in controversy.
84. Adverse possession under color of title is governed by FLA. STAT. §§ 95.16 and95.17 1957).85. This suggestion was also made in Day, The Validation of Erroneously Located
Boundaries by Adverse Possession and Related Doctrines, 10 U. FLA. L. REv. 245, 262
(1957).
86. See BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 221 (1959).
87. Id. at 135, 148-152.
88. Grossman v. Pollack, 100 So.2d 660 (Fla. App. 1958):
89. Connelly v. Smith, 97 So.2d 865 (Fla. App. 1957), cert. denied, 101 So:2d
811 (Fla. 1958).
90. Chappell v. Hasche, 98 So.2d 808 (Fla. App. 1957).
91. Miami Gardens v. Conway, 102 So.2d 622 (Fla. 1958).
92. Ibid.
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Trusts and Trustees. Under a Florida statute, 3 a conveyance to a
named grantee "as trustee" without designating any beneficiary and without
other reference to a trust, and there being no recorded declaration of trust
at the time of recording the deed or conveyance, vests the full fee simple
estate in the named grantee with full power and authority in the named
grantee to sell, convey and grant the complete title. This statute, formerly
relating only to conveyances, was amended by the 1959 legislature to apply
also to mortgages and other instrumentsY
4
Foreign Limited Partnerships. "Foreign limited partnerships, under new
legislative provisions,"' are precluded from acquiring, holding and disposing
of property, and from doing business within the state, until qualified.
Reservations, State Releases. A statutory enactment 6 removes limita-
tions on the powers of the Trustees of the I.I.F. and the State Board of
Education to release mineral and similar reservations in parcels of land
larger than one acre.
Cancellation. The "clean hands" doctrine was invoked to affirm a
dismissal and summary judgment for the defendant in Spector v. Ahrenholz,"T
which was a suit by the grantor to void a deed and recover an undivided
one half interest in certain property. The deed was issued at a time when
the grantors were in financial difficulty and, according to the grantors, was
for their protection, and, according to the grantee, as security for money
advanced and for his protection. The chancellor denied relief on the basis
that one executing a deed to hinder or defraud creditors was not entitled
to maintain a suit to regain the property, and this conclusion was affirmed.
Exceptions to this doctrine permitting the grantor to obtain relief when
the parties are not in pari delicto were held inapplicableY
In two cases seeking cancellation of a deed on the basis of the grantor's
incompetence, the chancellor's decree denying relief on the basis of an
insufficient showing of the incompetency was affirmed, the court reiterating
the rule that where there is evidence to support the decree, or where
there is conflicting evidence, the decree will be affirmed unless clearly
erroneous uD Relief was granted in another case, however, where it was
93. FA. STAT. § 689.07 (1957).
94. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-251.
95. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-395.
96. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-220, amending FLA. STAT. § 270.11 (1957).
97. 107 So.2d 34 (Fla. App. 1958).
98. Spector v. Ahrenholz, suijra note 97. Examples given in the case for application
of the exception include instances where the grantee obtains the (Iced by fraud, duress
or abuse of confidential relationship. '[lie dissenting judge thought that whether or not
the parties were in tPari delieto could be better detennined in the trial and not on a
motion for summary decree.
99. Tyler v. Tyler, 108 So.2d 312 (11a. App. 1959); Lamson v. Martin, 104 So.2d
117 (Fla. App. 1958).
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established that the grantor at the time was in a weakened mental condi-
tion, and the consideration was inadequate.'00
Notice and Recording. The general principles of notice and priorities
were applied in a few cases not indicating any particularly significant
development. In Doyle v. Tutan,'0 for example, the plaintiff in a quiet
title suit purchased the realty after notice of a lis pendens had been filed
by the executor and former beneficiary of the sole owner. Normally, the
purclaser under such circumstances would take With notice, although
without actual knowledge or notice, and subject to the decree subsequently
rendered in the suit. However, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may
apply, and would apply in the instant case if the allegations of the
complaint should be established. The allegations were that the executor
and sole beneficiary, plaintiff in the suit pendente lite, participated in the
negotiations and purchase transactions of the present plaintiff, approved the
sale and personally benefited therefrom, and remained silent for more than
a-year following the purchase during which time the plaintiff made monthly
payments on an outstanding first mortgage. Hence, the complaint stated
a cause of action and it was error to dismiss it.'0 2
Possession inconsistent with the record title normally constitutes notice
of the rights of the possessor, and hence the purchaser of such lands
takes subject to the rights of the possessor.'0 3 There is an exception in
case of estoppel, however. Thus, in Roberts v. Bass,04 it was held that a
grantor in possession was estopped from disputing the record title of the
grantee, and was precluded from asserting the limited rights of the
grantee under an unrecorded collateral agreement. Under these circum-
stances, the possession of the grantor, in the absence of actual notice
to the bona fide purchaser for value, did not constitute notice of the
grantor's interest under the unrecorded instrument. 05
The usual rule of notice was applied in the ease of Denco, Inc. v.
Belk, 06 involving the right of a lessee of first refusal should the land be
sold during the term of the lease. The executor and all of the beneficiaries
of the estate of the lessor joined in conveyances to the defendant grantee,
each deed being made subject to existing leases with person or persons
100. Snyder v. Limbeck, 108 So.2d 783 (Fla. App. 1959). Voidable deeds by mental
incompetents not under guardianship generally can be set aside only on a showing of
inequitable advantage, fraud or lack of consideration. BOYER, FLORI)A REAL ESTATE.
TRANSACTIONS 168 (1959). See also Webb v. Webb, 145 Fla. 267, 199 So. 343 (1941),
setting aside two deeds but upholding an agreement for deed because it was fair.
Other cases dealing with' incompetents during this period are discussed under VENDOR
AND PURCHASER, p. 639 suTra.
101. 110 So.2d 42 (Fla. App. 1959).
102. Doyle v. Tutan, suOra note 101.
103. BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 722 (1959), discussing also the
proper characterization of such notice.
104. 111 So.2d 455 (Fla. App. 1959).
105. Roberts v. Bass, su/ra note 104. The case followed Reasoner v. Fisikelli, 114
Fla. 102, 153 So. 98 (1934).
106. 97 So.2d 261 (Fla. 1957), and 109 So.2d 201 (Fla. App. 1959).
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in possession. It was held that the lessee was entitled to enforce his
option against the purchaser who was charged with notice of all the
terms of the lease, not only by the lessee's possession, but also by the
very terms of the deeds by which he took title. The non-claim statute barring
belatedly filed claims against a decedent's estate was held inapplicable
since the action was in reality against the purchaser from the estate to
enforce the lessee's rights, those rights, including the option, being a
part of the lease and subject to which the purchaser acquired the landI10 7
III. ESTATES, l)OWER, l-IomfSTEAD AND FUTURE INTERErSTS
Estates by the Entireties. Tenancies by the entireties continue to be
a fruitful source of litigation. Although the characteristics of the estate
are well established, the application of these characteristics to new factual
situations seems unlimited. At least some of the difficulty is occasioned,
it is believed, by the recognition of this estate in personalty and the
attempt to apply equally the more or less rigid real property concepts to the
many varied and flexible personal property structures.
The case of Tingle v. H-ornsby08 is illustrative of the problem that
may be raised. In this case real property was owned by a married man.
He entered into a contract of sale, and, quite naturally, his wife joined in
executing the contract. The vendor and his wife were simply designated
as the "sellers." During the continuance of the contract, the vendor-
husband died, and a dispute arose as to the ownership of the proceeds of
the contract between the surviving wife and the step-daughter. The widow
claimed the entire proceeds as a surviving tenant by the entireties, and
her adversary claimed that she had no interest other than that of surviving
widow of the decedent.
The District Court of Appeal held that a wife's joinder in a contract
of sale of her husband's real estate nay, under the doctrine of equitable
conversion, make the husband and wife tenants by the entireties in the
proceeds of the sales contract. Whether or not such an estate results
depends upon the intent of the parties; thus it was error for the trial
court to grant a summary final decree for the step-daughter since the
matter of intent and the interest created should be determined on trial. 00
It is difficult to disagree with the reasoning of the court, but cognizance
should be taken of standard conveyancing practices in Florida. It is
obvious, of course, that the wife had to join in the contract in order for
the purchaser to obtain an enforceable instrument not only against the
husband, but also against the wife. No special significance should be
107. Denco, Inc. v. Belk, supra note 106.
108. 111 So.2d 274 (Fla. App. 1959).
109. Tingle v. Honisby, supra note 108.
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attached to the fact that the wife was designated a co-vendor since it
is believed that this is the customary way for husband and wife to execute
such contracts in Florida. The contract could, of course, specify that the
wife was joining simply for the purpose of conveying or releasing her
dower right, but it is doubtful if many contracts in Florida do in fact so
specify. Further, by statute,110 it is provided that a wife may release her
dower by joining as co-grantor in a deed with her husband, and it is
believed that this is the customary way in which dower is released in
Florida. It is doubtful that many deeds in Florida spell out, where such
is the case, that the wife is joining for the purpose of releasing her dower,
and, in fact, the statutory warranty deed"' contains no specific recitals
for the release of dower.
Nevertheless, and in spite of the fact that no special significance
should be made of the wife's simply joining as co-vendor, it is possible, as
long as there is general recognition of such an estate in personal property,
for the husband to have intended a gift to his wife at the time of sale
and to have in fact made her a tenant by the entireties. In cases like
this, however, it would seem fair to put the burden of proof on the
surviving alleged co-tenant. Otherwise, and perhaps sound practice requires
it anyway, the normal conveyancing instruments should be modified to
specify the exact interests of the parties thereto and indicate clearly the
purpose of each one in joining in the execution of each particular instrument.
Partnerships and Estates by the Entireties. A partnership between two
marital communities owning real estate required judicial clarification of the
proper relationship between the principles of partnership and the characteris-
tics of the entireties estate in Lacker v. Zuern.1 2 An action was brought
bv a wife who, with her hnsband, owned an undivided one half interest in
the partnership as tenants by the entireties. The action was against her
husband and the other partners for dissolution and other relief on the
grounds that she had been forced out of participating in the business and
that the other partners, including her husband, were draining off profits
and salaries.
The chancellor dismissed the case on the ground that the right to
dissolve the partnership was in irreconcilable conflict with the status of
the plaintiff as tenant by the entirety. The case was reversed on the
proposition that the two principles were not necessarily mutually exclusive,
and that the plaintiff alleged facts under which she should be entitled to
equitable relief.
The court stated that the partnership could be dissolved without
destroying the estate by the entirety existing between the plaintiff and her
110. FLA. STAT. §§ 693.02 and 689.03 (1957).
111. FLA. STAT. § 689.02 (1957).
112. 109 So.2d 180 (Fla. App. 1959).
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husband as to their interest in the partnership. Since the estate is recognized
in personalty as well as in realty, the estate by the entireties will attach
to the partners' interest as it is withdrawn in whatever form such with-
drawal may take. Further, each tenant by the entireties owes the other the
highest degree of confidence and trust, hence equitable relief may be
granted against the husband where he is draining off the profits of the
property so held.1 8
Entireties; Other Problems. A number of other problems concerning
estates by the entireties also arose during this period. A few are noted at
this point, but the survey article on Domestic Relations should be consulted
for additional cases. Construction of the statute"14 permitting a direct
conveyance between husband and wife to create the estate was a principal
issue in Little River Bank 6 Tnst Company v. Eastman. '"' The convey-
ance was by the husband of an undivided half interest to his wife in order
to create an estate by the entirety. A creditor of the deceased husband
claimed that the deed was effective to create the entireties estate only in
a one half interest of the property.
In holding that the wife was entitled to the entire parcel, the court
concluded that the decd was ineffective to create an estate by the entireties,
presumably because some of the four unities were lacking,"0 but that it
created a tenancy in common with a right of survivorship in the whole
estate, the phraseology, ". . . the intention . . . to create an Estate by
Entireties .... " being equivalent to the expression of a right of survivor-
ship.' 17 The result is sound, but the reasoning may be unduly technical.
Has not the legislature evidenced an intent to minimize or disregard the
requirement of unity of time, title, interest and possession in the creation
of tenancies by the entireties?' Is not form being elevated above substance?
To the contention that the result is the same, the reader is reminded of the
differing rights of creditors, and of the differing rights of the parties them-
sclvcs in conveyancing, applicable to other co-tenancies'' 0 with the right of
113. Lacker v. Zuern, supra note 112.
114. FA. STAT. § 689.11 (1957).
115. 105 So.2d 912 (Fla. App. 1958).
116. At common law, the four unities applicable to joint tenancies, tille, title, interest
and possession, plus also the unity of husband and wife, were necessary in tenancies by
the entireties. BoirE, FLoRMA REAL. ESTATE IRANSACTIONs 435, 439 (1959).
117. FLA. STAT. § 689.15 (1957), provides that, except in cases of estates by the
entirety, the right of survivorship shall not be recognized in joint tenancies unless it is
specifically expressed.
118. The reference is to FLA. STAT. § 689.11 (1957), permitting direct conveyances
between the parties to create such an estate.
119. joint tenants can separately destroy the right of sun'ivorship by individually
conveying their separate interest, and their respective creditors can attach their separate
interest. Tenants by the entireties are powerless individually to convey or incumber the
estate, and separate creditors are unable to attach the separate intercsts of a tenant by
the entireties. See BoYF:R, op. cit. supra note 116. §§ 20.01 (1) and (2), 22.02 (3). See
also a note on the principal case relative to the rights of creditors by lamner, 34
FLA. B.J. 40 (1960).
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survivorship as compared to those rights applicable to tenancies by the
entireties.
Other cases involving this estate held: that on divorce the parties
become tenants in common and that this result is not affected by a
property settlement vesting rights in the wife to other property but not
mentioning that held as tenants by the entireties; 120 that a purchase money
mortgage payable to the husband and wife on sale of the husband's
property raises a presumption of a gift and makes the parties tenants by
the entireties therein unless there is clear proof to the contrary;' and
that in a suit against the wife for the balance due on a contract for
building materials, the contract having been made for the improvement
of property held by the husband and wife as tenants by the entireties,
there are raised questions of fact concerning the alleged agency of the
husband and the issue of whether or not the wife contracted jointly with
him so that the entry of a summary judgment is not warranted; 2 2 and
a contract for the conveyance of entireties property must be witnessed
to be enforceable) 2
3
Joint Tenancies with the Right of Survivorship. The ability to create
joint tenancies with the right of survivorship has been expressly recognized
by statute since 1941.124 Prior to that time, the statute in question simply
provided that the doctrine of the right of survivorship in real and personal
property held by joint tenants should not prevail in this state.125 In
construing the effect of a deed, executed before the statutory amendment,
conveying lands to a mother and daughter, or the survivor, a District
Court of Appeal held that it created a valid joint tenancy with the right
of survivorship, and that the statutory amendment in 1941 was simply
declaratory of the common law as it then existed.1 26 As thus construed, the
only right of survivorship that was not recognized was that incident to a
joint tenancy without a specific expression of the characteristic, and specific
provisions for the right of survivorship were valid.
Remainders. The construction of a devise to a husband for life and
at his death to be divided equally between a son and daughter was the
principal issue in In Re Martin's Estate' 27 Since one of the remaindermen,
the daughter, died before the life tenant, a problem arose as to the
disposition of the deceased daughter's share. It was held, and quite
correctly, it would seem, that the will created a life estate followed by
120. Quick v. Leatherman, 96 So.2d 136 (Fla. 1957).
121. Lauderdale v. Lauderdale, 96 So.2d .663 (Fla. App. 1957). See also text
discussion accompanying note 108 supra.
122. Anderson v. Carter, 100 So.2d 831 (Fla. App. 1958).
123. Petersen v. Brotman, 100 So.2d 821 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 104 So.2d 59"4
(Fla. 1958).
124. FLA. STAT. § 689.15 (1957).
125. Fla. Laws 1927, ch. 5482.
126. Florida Nat'i Bank of Jacksonville v. Gann, 101 So2d 579 (Fla. App. 1958).
127. 110 So.2d 421 (Fla. App, 1959).
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vested remainders, and therefore, upon the death of the daughter, her
remainder interest passed under her will to her husband. The decision
is perfectly sound and consistent with well recognized principles, the only
thing that is difficult to see is why it should have caused any difficulty
in the first place. No other construction seems plausible. There is clearly
no contingency expressed; no condition of survivorship, either precedent or
subsequent, is indicated in the language of the will.
Restraints on Alienation. The policy favoring the.free alienation of
land and the invalidation of restrictions on the alienation of fees simple
has its roots in early common law. The principle, however, is still very
much a part of our law and may arise in unexpected ways. Thus, in Kass v.
Lewin,128 the Supreme Court invalidated certain provisions of a special
act of the legislature applicable to Dade County on the basis in part that
it acted as an invalid restraint on alienation. The act related to plats and
subdivisions and, among other things, prevented the conveyance of certain
lands without preparing and recording a plat. This was an unreasonable and
unconstitutional restraint on alienation.520
Perpetuities. Two cases during the period of this survey involved the
application of the Rule Against Perpetuities to options in leases. Sisco v.
Rotenberg' 0 avoided the major perpetuities issue by holding that where
a lease for five years contained both an option to renew and an option to
purchase, the renewal provision was satisfied by one renewal. Hence, there
could be no perpetuity problem arising from successive renewals inde-
finitely with the concomitant prolongation of the option to purchase. "Wing,
Inc. v. Arnold,'8 ' on the other hand, came to grips with the problem, and
held specifically that an option to purchase contained in a 99 year lease did
not violate the Rule. It further indicated that the option to purchase
would follow the lease into its renewals, and that such an extended or
revived option to purchase would likewise not violate the Rule Against
Perpetuities. This is in accord with the weight of American authority182 and
is supported by the fact that such options stimulate improvement of the
128. 104 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1958).
129. Other grounds for the decision were that the titles to the act and its amendment
were deceptive and misleading, and that it was discriminator% and violative of the equal
protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Kass v. Lewin, supra note 128.
For a succinct synopsis of the rules concerning the validity of restraints on alienation, see
BOYvR, FLORInA REAL. ESTATF TRANSACTIONS § 22.08 (1959).
In Macregor v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 99 So.2d 709 (Ha. 1958), the
supreme court approved disciplinary proceedings against a broker because of deception,
bad faith, and false representations in negotiating a sale to a non-Christian in violation
of the condition imposed in the listing agreement. The court reiected the contention
that this was an attempt to enforce a discriminatory covenant within the prohibition of
Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), but regarded it simply as a disciplinary proceeding
against the broker.
130. 104 So.2d 365 (Fla. 1958).
131. 107 So.2d 765 (Fla. App. 1958).
132. See the authorities cited in the case, 107 So.2d 765 at 769.
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land and promote alienation rather than hinder it. Thus, the result differs
from that applicable to options in gross. l 35
Dower; Legislation, Election. Chapter 59-123 of the 1959 Florida Laws
adds a subsection to section 731.35 to allow a widow sixty days to elect
to take dower from the date to which the county judge extends the time
for filing creditors' claims, from the date of a final judgment of a litigated
claim, or from the time allowed a personal representative to file objections
to a claim. The existing subsection 3 of the same statute was repealed.
Dower, cases. A number of interesting cases concerning dower arose
during the past biennium. It was held, for example, that a wife's voluntarily
leaving her husband did not bar her claim to dower as the statute of
Westminster II is not a part of our common law.13 4 It was also reaffirmed
that a wife need not join in a purchase money mortgage since her dower
in such land is subject to the mortgage whether she joins or not; hence
refusal of the wife to join in such a transaction is no excuse for the
nonperformance of the husband vendee to perform a contract calling for
such financing. 35
A voluntary conveyance by a man prior to marriage to defeat his
prospective wife's dower may be avoided, but only if the evidence is
clear and convincing. Thus, in a particular case involving remarriage with
his former wife, the court refused to grant her relief and refused to impose
a constructive trust on the grantee because of insufficient proof.'36 The
court similarly refused to impose a constructive trust in another case' 87
which involved a conveyance without the wife's joinder of a married man
to another woman with whom he apparently lived in an unorthodox
relationship. The wife, however, was entitled to dower, but the court of
equity had no power to assign it after it was concluded that there was
no basis for equitable relief. Assignment of dower is the province of the
County Judge's Court.
In a suit involving specific performance on the exercise of an option
in whose execution the optionor's wife did not join, the court stated
that the optionee was entitled to equitable relief. 188 The exact nature of
the relief was held to be dependent upon the issue of notice. If the
optionee had notice that the optionor was married, then he was entitled
only to specific performance subject to the wife's dower interest, but if
133. Such options are subject to the Rule. These two cases are discussed more
completely in BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 35.07 [2] (1959).
134. Wax v. Wilson, 101 So.2d 54 (Fla. App. 1958). Cf. Kreisel v. Ingraham,
113 So.2d 205 (Fla. App. 1959), permitting the husband to inherit from the wife
although he had been separated and long in arrears in payments under a separate
maintenance decree.
135. Lewis v. Belknap, 96 So.2d 212 (Fla. 1957).
136. Davis v. Davis, 98 So.2d 777 (Fla. 1957).
137. Coleman v. Davis, 106 So.2d 81 (Fla. App. 1958).
138. Paradise Pools v. Cenauer, 104 So.2d 860 (Fla. App. 1958).
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he had no such notice, he would be entitled to such specific performance
but with an abatement of the purchase price. 39
The effect of a settlement agreement was detcrined in Youngelson v.
Youngelson's Estate.'40 It was therein held that a settlement agreement
entered into betwccn the widow and the executor and heirs of the husband
after his death was a sufficient basis for denying her application for dower
although she changed her mind within the period allowed for filing
such an election. The court held that such an agreement is presumptively
valid and can only be set aside on a showing of fraud or overreaching.
Homestead; Tax Exemption, Legislation. Chapter 59-270 of the 1959
Laws of Florida enacted section 192.141 providing that the rental of an
entire dwelling shall result in the loss of the homestead taxation exemption.
Certain exceptions and limitations on the doctrine are also provided.
Homestead; Incwnbrance, Conveyance and Descent. Homestead prob-
lems continued to be a rather prolific source of litigation during the period
of this survey. The proposition that a mortgage to be effective as an
incumbrance against the homestead must be executed in the presence of
two subscribing witnesses now appears to be well established.' The factual
determination of the necessary elements for the acquisition of the home-
stead status were predominant issues in several cases. In Solomon v. Davis,1
42
the principal issue was whether realty of the wife on which she resided
with her husband and two minor grandchildren constituted the homestead.
Both the husband and wife were employed, and the wife's earnings were
the sole support of herself and the grandchildren. Vhile recognizing that
a wife may be head of a family for homestead purposes if the facts
substantiate her claim, the Supreme Court, in denying her claim, stated:
"... we find no case in which an able-bodied, continuously employed
husband has been found to have abdicated his presumptive position as
head of the family, where the primary family relationship of husband and
wife remains intact with all the attendant duties and obligations thereby
imposed upon him under our law."' 43 Thus, the homestead law did not
apply, and the property was subject to forced sale to satisfy the creditors'
claims.
In Engel '. Engel,'44 the principal factor relative to the homestead
status was the. requirement that the decedent had resided there as his
permanent home. The court, analogizing the permanency requirement to
that of domicile, added that "The only proper concept of permanency
when used in this sense means the presence of the intention to reside at
139. Ibid.
140. 114 So.2d 642 (FIl, App. 1959).
141. Iieberman v. Burley, 100 So.2d 89 (Tin'. App. 1958); Perry v. Beckerman,
97 So,2d 860 (Ila. 1957), amended decree rev'd on other grounds, 106 So.2d 185
(Fla, 1958), Sec note 14 mpra for .i similar requirement relative to sales contracts.
142. 100 So.2d 177 (Fla. 1958).
143. Id. at 179.
144. 97 So.2d 140 (Fla. App. 1957).
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that particular place for an indefinite period of time." 14 5 The court then
concluded, after a review of the evidence which was quite sufficient, that
the land was homestead. Hence, the devise to the second wife was invalid,
and his children were entitled to the remainder subject to the life interest
of the widow.
The proposition that a gratuitous conveyance of the homestead to
defeat the rights of living children or lineal descendants is void was
recognized or followed in a number of instances. 46 Thus, in Marsch v.
Hartley,47 it was held that a gratuitous conveyance of a homestead
through a conduit to create an estate by the entireties was ineffectual,
and hence on the death of the head of the family, the property descended
to the second wife for life with a remainder to the children. 48 The
problem of abandonment because of prolonged absence prior to a return
several years before death was raised but resolved in favor of the continuing
status of the homestead.
In Banks v. Banks, 14  the husband, in a divorce action sought to
have a previous conveyance to create a tenancy by the entireties held
void as a gratuitous conveyance of the homestead. The court denied his
claim on the basis that he failed clearly to allege and prove facts sufficient
to show the homestead character of the property.
Issue might be taken with the court's statement, "Property held by
the entireties does not and cannot constitute a homestead under Article X,
Section 4, of the Florida Constitution,"' 5 in Kinney v. Mosher. 5 The
court went on to explain, however, that entireties property is not subject
to the homestead descent provisions but instead vests in the surviving
tenant by the entireties. There is no dispute as to the end result; the only
question is as to the characterization. Since entireties' held property can
qualify for the creditor exemption from forced sale, 5 2 and since it can
145. Id. at 142.
146. The requirnient of consideration in the conveyance of homestead property is
discussed in BoVE:R, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE IRANSACIONS § 21.03 121 (1959), and in
Boyer, Survey of Real Property Law, 10 MIANi L.Q. 389, 397-398 (1956).
147. 109 So.2d 34 (Fla. App. 1959).
148. The statute regulating the descent of homesteads is FYLA. STAT. § 731.27 (1959).
149. 98 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1957).
150. Kinney v. Mosher, infra note 151 at 646.
151. 100 So.d 644 (Fla. App. 1958).
152. ttarkins v. Ilolt, 124 Fla. 774, 169 So. 481 (1936); Oates v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 113 Fla. 678, 116 Fla. 253, 117 Fla. 892, 152 So. 671 (1934). See also
Menendez v. Rodriguez, 106 Fia. 214, 143 So. 223 (1932).
Cf. the following excerpt discussing the homestead exemption to entireties held
property:
"Our hench has accordingly established two definite principles: the
surviving spouse takes all upon the death of the other, but the exemption
from forced sale attaches as a shield by virtue of the property interest
of the spouse serving as head of the family during his or her life. This
result is1 0not merely practical; it is also logical, once one admits that
the protected homestead interest need not be so extensive as sole
ownership in fee." (Footnotes omitted.) Crosby & Miller, Our Legal
Chameleon, The Florida ifomeste.id Exemption, 2 U. FLA. 1.. R V. 12,
34-35 (1949).
1960]
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also qualify for tax exemption, 1 'X might it not be preferable and less
misleading to characterize such property, where the factual tests are met,
as homestead but with the qualification that the usual homestead descent
provisions are inapplicable?
The usual rules as to the descent of homesteads and the non-applicability
of adverse possession against the holders of future interests were reaffirmed
in the case of Wagner v. Moseley, 54 involving a rather extreme set of
facts. The land was acquired under a contract of purchase in 1929; the
husband died in 1935; the widow remarried in 1936; the widow and her
second husband paid the balance of the contract and secured a deed in
1940 naming them both as grantees; the widow died in 1950; and her
second husband died in 1952. Suit was brought by children of the first
marriage in 1953. In holding for plaintiff children, it was concluded that
the land was homestead at the death of the first husband, that the widow
acquired a life estate with remainder to the children, that adverse possession
did not run against the remaindermen prior to the death of the widow,
and that the deed to the widow and her second husband should be
cancelled.
The case of Perry v. Beckerman'5  involved the application of the
constitutional exception to the doctrine of homestead immunity from forced
sale. Under this exception, 56 the homestead can be sold to satisfy an
obligation contracted by the homestead owner for the erection or repair
of improvements on the homestead real estate. The court concluded
that to come within the exception, the obligation must be one contracted
directly for labor and materials used in the construction of the improve-
ment. An advance of money borrowed to purchase materials or to pay for
labor is not within the scope of the exception. In such case the contract
is to repay money loaned or expended and it is not in the nature of a
contract to pay for the erection of the improvements or for the labor.
Thus, the court concluded that the holders of the makers' note, by their
purchase, merely advanced money to the original payee, supposedly for
use in completing a construction contract on makers' homestead, and
that a judgment on the note could not be enforced against the makers'
homestcad. 57 The court indicated that in a subsequent trial, the liability
of the homestead, if any, would have to be grounded on the construction
contract supplemented by the written agreement between the parties rather
than on the note and mortgage.
153. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 7.
154. 104 So.2d 86 (Fla. App. 1958).
155. 97 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1957), amended decree rev'd on the proposition that the
entire parcel and not just that portion including one building constituted the homestead,
106 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1958).
156. FLA. CONsT. art. X, § 1.
157. Perry v. Beckerman, supra note 155 at 863. The mortgage was ineffective as a
lien on the homestead because of lack of witnesses. See text accompanying note 141 supra.
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A settlement agreement entered into between the widow and the
executor and heirs of the husband after his death was held a bar to
homestead rights in Youngelson v. Youngelson's Estate.158
Free Dealer Law; Legislation. Section 62.42 of the Florida Statutes
was amended by the 1959 legislation in chapter 59-44, relative to service
of process on the husband, and by the addition of section 62.421 providing
for the mailing of a copy of the petition to the husband's residence.
Partition. In two suits involving partition some general principles were
reaffirmed: (1) a partition suit is not the proper proceeding in which to
settle a disputed title;'59  (2) partition is not available to holders of
equitable interests; 00 (3) improper service upon minor defendants is not
cured by the filing of an answer by the guardian ad litem, and the suit
is ineffective to divest such minors of their property interests, if any,' 61
and (4) a decree in a partition suit without having jurisdiction over all
interested parties does not void the proceedings as against those properly
before the court, but those who are not properly before the court may
bring a separate proceeding for the establishment of their rights.
1 2
IV. Rrcrs IN LAND
Covenants. There were a number of cases concerning covenants run-
ning with the land during the period of this survey, but they were largely
concerned with the application of settled principles. One case,163 dealing
with the problem of a change in the neighborhood, upheld the chancellor's
determination that there was an insufficient change to warrant a decree
cancelling the restrictions. Other cases dealt primarily with the construction
of particular covenants.
In Frumkes v. Boyer,'" the conveyance of a tract "less the North 30
feet thereof, which shall be dedicated within one year for a public street
or road" was held to constitute a covenant running with the land obligating
the grantor to dedicate said strip. The strip in question constituted a
portion of the south half of a proposed but unopened street. The grantors
based their non-dedication and claim to the strip on the fact that the
city had acquired adjacent land for recreational purposes and had decided
not to open the proposed street. The court concluded that the plain
language of the deed could not be altered by engrafting thereon an
exception that the city open the entire street, and that the grantee was
158. 114 So.2d 642 (Fla. App. 1959).
159. Rotntree v. Rountree, 101 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1958), earlier report, 72 So.2d 794
(Fia. 1954).
160. Ibid.
161. Foster v. Thomas, 112 So.2d 33 (Fla. App. 1959).
162. Ibid.
163. Batman v. Creighton, 101 So.2d 587 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 106 So.2d
199 (Fla. 1958).
164. 101 So.2d 387 (Fla. 1958).
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entitled to equitable relief. The court recognized that for a completed
dedication there must be an acceptance by the public or an appropriate
governmental unit, and then declined to state the rights of the parties
to the disputed strip should there be a completed dedication and later
abandonment, or a refusal of the offer to dedicate.
In other cases, the court: construed an applicable plat and ordinance
as not establishing building set back lines for a particular lot which was
irregular in shape and at whose borders the indicated set back lines
stopped;15 construed a covenant "to keep open railroad facilities" and to
"provide adequate railroad facilities" as requiring the covenantor and his
successors to actually provide the facilities and not simply to suffer use
of the land for such purposes by the grantee;166 and concluded that
operation of a motel on a track of land provided for laundry and clothes
drying services for the inhabitants of a trailer park was a commercial enter-
prise prohibited by the terms of the restrictive covenant. 167
Easements; Prescription. The differences and similarities between the
acquisition of title by adverse possession and the acquisition of an ease-
nent by prescription were delineated at length in Downing v. Bird.168
The court noted that the trend of decisions is to abandon the notion
of a presumptive lost grant as the basis for prescriptive easements," 9 and
to treat the acquisition of such easements as being perfected by methods
substantially similar to those pertaining to the acquisition of title by
adverse possession. The similarity of the two processes was furthered by
the enunciation that the claimant in both instances must clearly show
that the possession and user is adverse during the entire period, and that
the presumption is in favor of the legal owner in both situations. This
is somewhat of a change from earlier Florida decisions,1T but, to the
extent of any conflict in this regard, the Downing case will control.'
The difference in the periods of time necessary for the acquisition
of the respective interests was maintained; seven years for adverse possession
and twenty years for prescription. 1" The case involved the right to a
portion of a paved roadway, the defendants claiming under the special
165. Town of Palm Beach Shores v. Doty, 100 SoI2d 205 (Fia. App.), 4ff'd, 104
So2d 508 (Fla 1958).
166. Manic Industries v. Sheffield StcelProd., 105 So,2d 798 (Fla. App. 1958).
167. Malcom v. Smith, 112 So.2d 395 (Mla. App. 1955).
168. 100 So.2d 57 (Fa. 1958).
169. For a succinct explanation and summary of the "lost grant" theory, see Boyv.R,
Fi.OiRIDA RF.AL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS q 23.03(4)(a) (1959).
170. J. C. Verccn & Sons, hIc, v, user, 123 Fla. 641, 167 So. 45 (1936), quoting
with approval \Williamsoii v. Abbott, 107 S.C. 397, 93 S.E. 15 (1915), to the effect
that the user itself may raise a presumption of adverseness. The case of Zetrouer v.
7etroter, 89 Fla. 253, 103 So. 625 (1925), insofar that it indicated continuous use
without being adverse would le sufficient, was overruled by the principal case.
171. Downiimg v. Bird, 100 So.2d 57, 65 (Fila. 1958).
172. Ibid. See also BoYR, ELORiA II. EsTlAT THANSACTIONS 523 (1959).
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four year "deemed dedicated" statute '17 and also by virtue of a prescriptive
easement. Although there was some testimony to the effect that the road
had been paved by the city more than four years prior to the controversy,
the court concluded that such proof was not sufficiently established. Similarly,
as to a common law prescriptive easement, the court concluded that the
answer was insufficient in that it did not allege that the use by the public
during the period was adverse, or of such a character as to charge the
plaintiff or her predecessor with knowledge of such an adverse claim.
Further, the answer was deemed insufficient in not properly identifying
the route, terminii, location and width of the claimed easement. Hence, the
judgment of dismissal was reversed with both parties given leave to amend
their pleadings. 174
Easements by Implication. Many of the principles applicable to
easements by implication were reviewed in a number of recent cases. The
extent of the rights conferred in designated public or common lands
on individual grantees whose conveyances described the land in reference
to a plat were the focal issues in Wilson v. Dunlap'75 and Feig v. Graves.'7
The plat in the Wilson case showed a strip of land designated as "Beach"
and as "Beach Parkway" bordering a bay. Of course, the grantees of
individual lots in the platted lands obtained easements in the land set aside
for public purposes, 77 but the question arose whether they obtained an
interest in the fee so as to enable them to prevent the common grantor
from conveying the fee of the "Beach." It was pointed out that if the
land in controversy were set aside only for street purposes, then at least
a portion of the fee would pass to abutting owners, but that if it were
set apart for park, recreational or similar purposes, then no interest in
the fee would pass to abutting owners but that the owners of all the
platted lands would have an easement for the purposes designated. After
concluding that the "Beach" was set aside for multiple purposes, including
ingress, egress and park purposes, the court decided that individual grantees
acquired casements only and no interest in the fee; hence the common
grantor had the right to convey the fee subject to the easement. 78
173. FLA. STAT. § 341.66 (1953), providing that where a road had been constructed
by a municipa]ity and maintained continuously for a period of four years by a county
or municipality, the road would be deemed dedicated. This statute has since been
repealed, but similar provisions are found in FLA. S'rAT. § 337.31 (1957). Additional
provisions stating under what conditions the filing of a map shall be prima facie
evidence of ownership of the road by the particular governmental unit were inapplicable
in the Downing case, supra note 171.
174. Downing v. Bird, supra note 171. The case of Kirma v. Norton, 102 So.2d
653 (Fla. App. 1958). upheld the chancellor's decision based on conflicting testimony
of a sewage easement based on prescription, but the requirements of an easement by
implication were apparently also satisfied.
175. 101 So.2d 801 (Fla. 1958).
176. 100 So.Zd 192 (Fla. App. 1958).
177. See BovER, FLORIDA REA. ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 517-520 (1959); Boyer,
Sun,ey of Real Property Law, 8 MIAMI L.Q. 389, 420-422 (1954).
178. Wilson v. Dunlap, supra note 175.
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The Feig case' involved a "walkway" interposed between certain
platted lots and a lakeshore. It was held that the abutting owners acquired
title to the center of the "walkway" with an implied casement of access
to the waters of the lake. As the lake waters receded, the fee and easement
were expanded accordingly so that the abutting owners continued to own
to the center of the strip with an easement over the other half.
The general requirements for the implication of easements not attendant
conveyances in reference to a plat were reaffirmed in Kirna v. Norton. °80
These requirements are: a unity of title existing between the dominant and
servient estates prior to the severance and implication of the easement in
question; a conveyance at which time the easement is implied from
circunstances making such easement necessary for the complete enjoyment
of the estate granted or reserved; and, in addition, it is frequently held
that a use must have been continuous, apparent, permanent and necessary
when the unified title was severed. The claimed easement was a right of
drainage through an established sewage line to a river, and the court
expressed the opinion, correctly, it is believed, that an implied casement was
created, the court noting, among other things, that the requirement of
apparency is not synonymous with visible but only requires something
that may be discovered by reasonable inspection."'.
The court, in Manning v. Hall," stating that easements can be created
only by express grant, implication, or by prescription, 83 went on to state
in view of the law of "mutual drains" it was unnecessary to decide whether
the chancellor's finding of an easement by implication was supported by
the record. The court then quoted from two encyclopedias1 84 and an Iowa
case' 85 concerning drains and licenses which become irrevocable, and con-
cluded that the drainage ditches involved constituted a mutual drain which
neither party could interrupt without the consent of the other. Although the
writer is not desirous of engaging in a controversy over semantics or unduly
protracting this article, it is submitted that if one party has a right of
drainage through another party's land which cannot be revoked or inter-
ferred with without the mutual consent of both, then an easement in
179. Feig v. Craves, supra note 176.
180 102 So.2d 653 (Fla. App. 1958).
181. Ibid. The decision, however, seemed to be actually bottomed on an easement by
prescription. See note 174 suora.
182. 110 So.2d 424 (Fla. App. 1959).
183. Id. at 427 and citing other Florida cases to the same effect. The statement
is helieved too restrictive. See BoYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS j 23.03(5)
(1959), dealing with "Additional Methods [of Creating Easements]l." Much of the lan-
guage of the Florida courts relative to easements and licenses can be criticised. See gener-
ally BoYER, supra, ch. 23, and particularly §§ 23.01 and 23.08. In Carson v. Tanner, 101
So.2d 811 (Fla. 1958), the supreme court held that the doctrine of part performance
entitled grantees of a parcel of land to enforce an oral agreement for an casement of
ingress and egress.
184. 28 C.J.S. Drains § 52 (1941); 56 Am. Jun. Waters § 81 (1948). See Manning
v. Hall, 110 So.2d 424, 427 (Fla. App. 1959).
185. Vanneast v. Fleming, 79 Iowa 638, 44 N.W. 906, 908, 8 L.R.A. 277 (1890).
See Manning v. Hall, 110 So.2d 424, 427 (Fla. App. 1959).
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fact does exist, and the relationship is not changed by calling it the law
of mutual drains, an irrevocable license, or some other appellation.
The extent of the easement acquired in delineated streets by grantees
of platted land was the issue in Haase v. Unity of The Palm Beaches, Inc.186
It was therein reaffirmed that Florida follows in relation to streets'87 the
"intermediate" view which is also known as the "beneficial" or the
"complete enjoyment" rule. This means that the grantee's private right
of user is limited to such streets and alleys as are reasonably and materially
beneficial to the grantee and of which the deprivation would reduce the
value of his lot.""
Statutory Easement of Necessity; Miscellaneous Problems, The sta-
tutory easement of necessity applies only to lands to which there is no
accessible right of way; hence when a paved area was conveyed to the
county for right of way purposes, and the county then by resolution
confirmed the right of the plaintiff to use such area for ingress and egress,
there was no necessity for the plaintiff to have an additional easement
over adjacent land.'8 0 On the other hand, however, a person claiming
a statutory easement of necessity cannot be restricted to a trail across a
slough which becomes impassable for three months when, by shifting
the roadway a few feet to higher ground, a proper means of access would
be obtained. Thus, allegations to this effect present a genuine issue as
to the right to such an easement, and a summary judgment is not proper.9 0
An easement may be lost by adverse possession or estoppel, but
neither principle was held applicable in Wiggins v. Lykes Brothers, Inc.'9'
An interesting aspect of the case was that the assignee of the easement
was also in possession as sublessee of the owners of the servient land.
The court concluded that such possession was not adverse to the possessor's
rights under his original easement, did not constitute an abandonment
of his original easement, and did not work an estoppel. 92 Other interesting
aspects of the case, in light of earlier Florida decisions,193 are that it
186. 107 So.2d 196 (Fla. App. 1958). See also the text accompanying notcs 242-246
for related aspects of this problem.
187. The "broad or unity" rule is followed in Florida in relation to parks. See
Boyer, Survey of Real Property Law, 8 NMlAiAI L.Q. 389, 421 (1954); Annot., 7 A.L.R.
2d 607, 633 (1949).
188. See notes 186 and 187 supra.
189. Hewitt v. Menees, 100 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1958).
190. Bradshaw v. Prasek, 114 So.2d 821 (Fla. App. 1959).
191. 97 So.2d 273 (Fla. 1957).
192. For a general discussion of these and other methods of terminating easements,
see BOYER, Op. cit. suPra note 183, § 23.07.
193. Vereen and Sons, Inc. v. Houser, 123 Fla. 641, 167 So. 45 (1936); Burdine
v. Sewell, 92 Fla. 375. 109 So. 648 (1926), both stating that an easement is incorporeal,
imposed for the benefit of corporeal property, and that it requires two distinct tenements,
the dominant and servient. Thus, all easements would seem to be appurtenant. For a
criticism of this requirement, see BoYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIOrCs § 23.01(1)
(1959).
19601
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appears to recognize, without expressly stating so, an easement in gross
and that such an easement can be assigned. This is justified, however. 94
The ease of Albury v. Central and Southern Florida Flood Control
District""5 also recognized an easement in gross in favor of the state for
the purpose of constructing canals, and further upheld the transfer of such an
easement or function from one governmental agency to another. The court
also concluded, and correctly, it is believed, that the easement was
not lost by estoppel or by abandonment, the general rule being that
non-use, even forty-six years of non-use, does not constitute an abandon-
nicnt. 106
The scope of a prescriptive casement is generally determined by the
extent or scope of the use during the period of the acquisition of the
easement. Thus, it was held that after the State Road Department had
acquired a prescriptive easement of a designated location, it had no right
to extend the easement and could not acquire an additional fifteen feet
without compensation, and the property owner was entitled to a decree
requiring the Department to remove the additional paving or resort to
eminent domain to acquire the additional easement." 97
Water Rights. The increasing importance of the waters of Florida
is reflected by the large number of cases and significant development in
recent years. The cases on accretion and reliction, 198 as well as cases involving
water boundaries' 9 and a drainage easement,200 have already been dis-
cussed.201 Other important decisions are presented in this section.
Lakes. The rights of abutting owners to the use of the waters of a
non-navigable lake for purpose of boating, bathing and fishing were clearly
delineated for the first time in Duval v. Thomas.202 The Supreme Court
of Florida, in adopting what it denominated the civil law rule, stated that
the owner of property with portions of its boundaries under water of a
landlocked non-navigable lake may use all of the lake for boating, bathing
and fishing so long as he does not interfere with the rights of others, and
lie does not have exclusive dominion over the water overlying his land,
and he is not confined to his own boundaries.
203
194. The assignahility of casements in gross has apparently not been specifically
discussed in Florida. See generally, BOYER, op. cit. supra note 193, § 23.06.
195. 99 So.2d 248 (Fla. App. 1957).
196. Ibid. See also notes 192-194 supra.
197. Broward County v. Bonldin, 114 So,2d 737 (Fln. App. 1959).
198. Notes 72-76 supra and accompanying text; also note 179 and accompanying text.
199. Note 79 supra and accompanying text.
200. Note 182 sora and accompanying text.
201. See notes 198-200 supra.
202. 114 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1959), approving Duval v. Thomas, 107 So.2d 148
(Fla. App. 1958). For further elaboratidn on this interesting decision, see casenote




The rights of riparian owners in regards to consumptive usage of
lake waters was resolved on the basis of the common law doctrines of
reasonable use in Lake Gibson Land Company v. Lester.204 In this case
an injunction against pumping water from a lake205 for irrigation purposes
was reversed because of insufficient proof that the defendant had substantially
lowered the level of the water. 210 In addition to "reasonable use," the court
also spoke of the equal rights of owners and inferentially of a priority for
domestic uses. 2
07
A number of interesting questions concerning the nature of riparian
rights208 were raised but not decided because of contrary factual determina-
tions in McLaughlin v. Stier.200 The case turned on whether the appellees
had riparian rights, and the court concluded that there was ample evidence
to support the chancellor's determination that they had.
Riparian Rights; Right of Access. The amount of waters to which a
riparian owner's right of access extends was the crucial issue in the
factually interesting case of Carmazi v. Board of County Commissioners of
Dade County.210 It was therein held that the owners of land abutting on a
navigable stream were not entitled to compensation for loss of right of
access by boat to a nearby bay and other connecting navigable waters as
a result of the construction of a dam. The court concluded that this
asserted right of access was a right of navigation common to the public
in gdneral and not a riparian property right. The earlier case of WTebb v.
Giddens' 1n holding that the right of a riparian owner on an arm of a lake
to access to the main body of the lake could not be denied, was distin-
guished on the basis of unusual circumstances and equitable considerations
in that case.
204. 102 So.2d 833 (Fla. App. 1958).
205. It was not stated whether the lake was navigable or not. The decision was
based on Taylor v. Tampa Coal Co., 46 So.2d 392 (Fla, 1950), however, wherein the
lake involved was not navigable.
206. The level was lowered only 22/32 of an inch over several months.
207. The case stated that it did not give any priority to irrigation purposes, and then
quoted from Taylor v. Tampa Coal Co., supra note 205, which referred to a priority for
domestic purposes, For a brief statement of the common law rules and Florida
applications, see BoYF.R, FLORmA REAL EST.Tr TRANSACTIONS 632-633 (1959).
208. The questions ured by the appellants included: (1) Whether riparian rights
could be reserved upon sale of the upland: (2) whether a transfer of a noncontiguous
portion of riparian land severs riparian rights from the portion transferred; and (3)
whether non-riparian land acquires riparian rights when it is subsequently covered by
water.
The first of these propositions is discussed in BoYru.R, FIOR;D. REAI. ESTATE
TRANSACTeoNs 629-630 (1959), and the third, insofar as accretion and reliction are
concerned, in Boyer, op. cit. supra, at 207-208.
Feig v. Graves, 100 So.2d 192 (Fla. App. 1958), contains dicta that a dedicator
may reserve all riparian rights appurtenant to the land encumbered by the easement
dedicated.
209. 110 So.2d 462 (Fla. App. 1959).
210. 108 So.2d 318 (Fla. App. 19591. The supreme court earlier had declined
jurisdiction with an opinion in 104 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1958).
211. 82 So.2d 743 (Fla. 1955).
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Drainage, Surface Waters. The right of an owner to drain his land
through a natural watercourse, and the servitude of a lower owner to
submit to the drainage of surface waters over his land were reaffirmed in
Libby, McNeil 6 Libby v. Roberts.2 12 These propositions were also recog-
nized and applied in the earlier case of Pearce Y. Pearce?13
Submerged Sovereignty Land. Several significant cases involved the
title to submerged lands under non-tidal navigable lakes. Such lands are
denominated sovereignty lands, and the superior rights of the state and
the public have been recognized in spite of state issued tax deeds. The
principle of estoppel has been held inapplicable. Thus, in Adams v. Crews,
214
it was held that the fact that the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund
had conveyed submerged lands by tax deed did not estop the state
through the Trustees from asserting the invalidity of the tax title and
from asserting the rights of the people of the state to the submerged
land. The grantee in the tax deed was also unable to acquire any rights
under former Riparian Rights legislation 215 by bulkheading and filling
since that act excluded lakes other than tidewater lakes from its operation.
The case of Ruyle v. Dolly,215 also involving the title to submerged
sovereignty land, an invalid tax deed, and claimed estoppel, reached a
similar result. In this case a tax title issued against a private chain of
title whose inception was a seventy year old invalid conveyance of the
State Department of Education was held a nullity. As a result of an
erroneous survey in 1858, the land in question, actually situated in the
bed of a lake, was shown as being at least partly along the shore and in
a section which became vested in the Board of Education by act of
Congress. In 1886, the Board conveyed the land to private ownership,
thus starting a private chain of title which was eventually sold for
nonpayment of taxes in 1907 by an administrative tax proceeding. One
of the claimants derived title through these proceedings. In 1909, the
lake was drained, and in 1926, a new government survey established the
original meander line of the lake, and the actual shoreline of the lake
was also meandered as it existed before the lake was drained. The 1926
survey showed that in fact the land in question had been in the bed of
the lake and not upland as shown in the 1858 survey. Thus, the court
concluded that the 1858 survey was false or fraudulent or grossly in
212. 110 So.2d 82 (Fla. App. 1959). A decree ordering the defendant to remove
a dam and enjoining him from interfering with the natural drainage of plaintiff's land
was affirmed.
213. 97 So.2d 329 (Fla. App. 1957). The relief granted in this case was to compel
the defendant to construct certain openings in his dike.
214. 105 So.2d 584 (Fla. App. 19581.
215. Formerly FLA. STAT. §§ 271.01-271.09 (1955). The legislation was first
enacted in 1856 and extended in 1921 by the so-called "Butler Bill." It was repealed
in 1957. See Boyer, Ankus & Friedman, Survey of Real ProPerty Law, 12 U. lIA,1I
L. REV. 499, 516 (1958).
216. 110 So.2d 467 (Fla. App. 1959).
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error, and that the true location of the lake controlled the lands in
controversy. It was next decided that since the lands were in the bed
of the lake, they were sovereignty lands, and as such, did not vest in
the state by act of Congress, but rather vested in the state by virtue
of its sovereignty on admission into the Union in 1845. Therefore, the deed
by the State Board of Education in 1886 was void, subsequent taxation
of the land was void, the tax title was void, and the claimant deriving
his title through this chain of events had no title at all. The valid title
was that asserted by the tax claimant's adversary who had secured a deed
from the Trustees on July 20, 1956, that deed being the only one effective
to divest the state of its title.
217
The case of Stein v. Browin Properties, Inc.218 involved the question
of marketable title to submerged tidal lands. It was concluded that as to
such lands the seller had no marketable title since they had not been
improved by filling and extension of the upland. Under former legislation,
2 19
the owner of the upland could acquire title to such submerged lands
by making the necessary improvement. It was also held in this case that
the patentee from the federal government obtained no peculiar right to
that part of the land under tidal waters because of the fact that the
original patent contained a description of a specific number of acres.
Two cases involved the sale of submerged sovereignty lands under
procedures established by the 1957 legislation. In Bay Shore v. Steck-
loff,210 it was pointed out that the new legislation repealing the Riparian
Act,22' excepted from its operation those instances where the riparian
owners had made application to the U. S. Corps of Engineers for filling
pursuant to the former Act, and therefore, such owners' rights were
preserved. In Anderson v. Collins,2 2 2 it was held that a complaint alleging
that the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund were guilty of
gross abuse of discretion amounting to fraud by failing to investigate the
truth of representations of private applicants for deeds as to the ownership
of uplands, which'were actually owned by a city, failed to state a cause
of action in the absence of allegations of any protest made by the city,
or that any action was taken to enjoin the trustees from deeding the
property within thirty days after the hearing.
The usual test of navigability was reaffirmed in Lopez v. Smith 223
and cases involving the question of proper procedure for obtaining review
of an administrative water and navigational control authority held that the
217. Ruyle v. Dolly, supra note 216.
218. 104 So.2d 495 (Fla. 1958).
219. See note 215 supTra.
220. 107 So.2d 171 (Fla. App. 1958).
221. See note 215 supra.
222. 1ll So.2d 44 (Fla. App. 1959).
223. 109 So.2d 176 (Fla. App. 1959). The test is navigability in fact and capacity
rather than actual usage. See also text accompanying note 77 supra.
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proper method was by certiorari, but that the appropriate appellate court
could treat an appeal as an application for certiorari and should not dis-
miss the action? 24
Public Lands, Beaches, Legislation. A 1959 statute prohibits the state
sale of minerals in or under public beachcs. 2'
V. SPECIAL TrTLES
Adverse Possesion. Except for the court's rejection of the argument
in disputed boundary cases that fencing the encroached strip along with
the adjacent owned parcel constitutes adverse possession under color of
title,2281 the cases on adverse possession show no significant development. The
adverse possessor has been allowed to quiet title in a number of cases,
227
in one of which the court recognized that navigable waters might form
at least a part of the substantial enclosure for such purposes.228 The
case of Downing v. Bird,22 9  primarily concerned with prescription,
reviewed a considerable amount of the law of adverse possession, another
case held that one who acquired title to a disputed strip by adverse
possession and did not pay taxes thereon could lose the title to a tax
purchaser of the adjoining land whose tax deed included the disputed
strip,230 another reiterated that the possession cannot be permissive, 31
and some simply held that the evidence was sufficient to show adverse
possession 232
Dedication. Cases on dedication in recent years reaffirmed such gen-
eral principles as: filing a plat operates as an offer to dedicate the streets,
alleys, parkways and other public lands depicted thereon,233 the offer
may be revoked before acceptance; - 4 acceptance may be shown by user
as well as by an express act of acccptancc;235 acceptance of one street in
224. Swope v. Coryell, 107 So.2d 153 (Fla. App. 1958), writ discharged, Ill So,2d
669 (Fla. 1959); Allimce For Conservation of Natural Rcsonrces'v. FUrcn, 104 So.2d
803 (Fla. App. 1958), subsequent proceedings, 110 So.2d 55 (Fla. App. 1959).
225. Fla. Laws 1959. ch. 59-178.
226. Blackburn v. Florida West Coast Land & Dcv. Co., 109 So.2d 413 (Fla. App.),
cert. denied. 114 So.2d 3 (FaI. 1959). See text accompanying notes 82-86 supra
for further discussion of the case.
227. Tampa Mortgage & Title Co. v. Smythc, 109 So.2d 202 (Fla. App. 1959);
Hlopson v. Sanborn, 97 So.2d 200 (Ila. App. 1957).
228. Tampa Mortgage & Title Co. v. Smythe, supra note 227.
229. 100 So,2d 57 (Fla, 1958).
230, Lvkes Bros. v, Birautcheck, 106 So.2d 582 (la. App. 1958). Se also note
83 sira.
231. Wiggins v. Lykes Bros., Inc.. 97 Sp.2d 273 (Fla. 1957).
232., Boyd v. Evans Properties, isc., 104 So.2d 109 (Tia. App. 1958); Hlopson v.
Sanborn, 97 So.2d 200 (Fla. App. 1957).
233. Niurrell v. United States, 269 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1959); Walton v. City of
Clermont, 109 So.2d 403 (Fla. App. 19591; Laube v. City of Stuart, 107 Sn.2d 757
(Fla. App. 1958); l"eig v. Craves, 100 So.2d 192 (Fla. App. 1958).
234. Wallon v. City of Clermont, supra note 233 at 406, Feig v. Graves, supra
note 233, at 195 (by implication).
235. Walton v. City of Clermont, supra note 233.
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a platted subdivision usually operates as an acceptance of all the streets
shown thereon;230 adverse possession cannot operate to divest the public
or governmental unit of rights in a dedicated street;2 37 a common law dedi-
cation vests only an easement in the public;238 and the collection of taxes
by a municipality does not estop that entity from claiming a completed
dedication.230 In a number of cases the evidence was held sufficient to
support a finding of dedication,240 while in another it was held insuffi-
cient.
2 41
Three cases involving the title to the underlying fee in connection
with conveyances in reference to a plat are worthy of note. In Feig Y.
Graves,242 the plaintiff's land was separated from a lakeshore by a "walk-
way." It was held that his title extended to the center of the walkway with
an implied easement of access to the waters of the lake extending over
the balance of the walkway.243
In Wilson v. Dunlap,2"4 the plaintiff's land was separated from a bay
by a strip of land designated alternately as a "beach" or "beach parkway."
It was held that since the strip was set aside for multiple purposes rather
than simply roadway purposes, the plaintiff, abutting owner, acquired no
title to the fee but simply an easement.2 45 In Murrell v. United State, 246
a condemnation case involving the right to compensation for land taken,
there was a strip of land interposed between building sites and the ocean.
The federal court, approving but distinguishing the Wilson case, held that
the strip was intended to be used only for street or roadway purposes.
Thus, under the Wilson case, the title of the abutting owners extended
at least to the center of the strip, but the court went on to decide, since
there was no evidence of a contrary intent, that the title of the abutting
owners extended the entire width of the strip to the ordinary high water
mark of the Atlantic ocean. Since the "street" had been vacated, the
abutting owners were thus entitled to the award for this strip of land.
236. ibid.
237. Laube v. City of Stuart, supra note 233.
238. Florida State Turnpike Authority v. Anhoco Corp.. 107 So.2d 51 (Fla. App.
1958), modified, 114 So.2d 39 (Fla. App. 1959), to comply with a then unpublished
mandate of the supreme court.
239. Downingi v. Bird, 100 So.2d 57, 60-61 (Fla. 1958); Laube v. City of Stuart,
107 So.2d 757 (Fla. App. 1958).
240. Cannon v. Putnam County, 104 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1958), earlier decision, 75 So.2d
577 (Fla. 1954): Walton v, City of Clermont, 109 So.2d 403 (Fla. App. 1959);
Laube v. City of Stuart, supra note 239.
241. Downing v. Bird, 100 So.2d 57 (Fla. 1958).
242. 100 So.2d 192 (Fla. App. 1958).
243. The principle of reliction was also involved. See text accompanying notes
75-76 supra. The issue in the case was the right of the abutting owner to have access
to the lake and to enjoy the riparian rights attached to the walkway. These rights
were protected.
244. 101 So.2d 801 (Fla. 1958).
245. In this case the abutting owner sought to have a deed conveying the fee in
the strip cancelled. It was concluded that the abutter, not owning the fee, was not
entitled to have the deed cancelled, but the rights of the abutter to use the strip
were recognized.
246. 269 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1959). See also text accompanying notes 75 and 186.
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The conversion of a state land service highway on land dedicated for
right of way purposes to a limited access facility has been held to be not
so inconsistent with former use as to amount to an abandonment of the
public casement which would thus cause a reversion.
247
Eminent Domain. In State Plant Board v. Smith,248 one of many cases
concerning eminent domain, the Supreme Court of Florida distinguished
eminent domain from the police power, and discussed the application of
section 12 of the Bill of Rights of the Florida Constitution.2 4 The case
arose as a result of the Plant Board's action in destroying a number of
the plaintiff's trees under legislative authority250 for the containment and
eradication of a citrus disease known as the spreading decline and caused
by the burrowing nematode.
The act provided for compulsory destruction of infested trees and
fumigation of the soil, and the plan adopted by the Board, which was
clearly implied in the act, was known as the "pull and treat" program.
This program was carried out summarily in any grove where the burrowing
nematodes were found, and the grove owner was accorded a hearing on
the sole question of the adequacy of the compensation to be paid for
destruction of the non-infested trees,2 ' and this only after the trees were
actually destroyed. Various aspects of the act and the actions pursuant
thereto were held invalid.
The court first stated that this was not a case of appropriation
of private property for public use, hence section 29 of Article 16 was
inapplicable, 252 but rather an exercise of the police power. The court
then considered the application of section 12 of the Declaration of
Rights, 25  and stated that the prohibition thercin contained against taking
private property without just compensation and due process of law was
not limited to taking under the power of eminent domain. The court
then noted that the destruction of certain property under the police power
did not require compensation, but distinguished those cases from the
instant one where the "just compensation" was a clear requisite for the
act of destruction. 254
247. Florida State Turnpike Authority v. Anhoco Corp., 107 So.2d 51 (Fa. App.
1958), modified, 114 So.2d 39 (Fla. App. 1959), to comply witli a then unpublished
mandate of the supreme court.
248. 110 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1959).
249. This section provides, among others, that no person shall he deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, and that private property shall not be
taken without just compensation.
250. Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-365; FiA. STAT. § 581.17 (1957).
251. No compensation was to be paid for infested trees whether or not the
"decline" had started. The case brought out that for sometime after the trees were
infested, they would bear fruit, and that such fruit while the tree is still healthy
is no different from the fruit of non-infested trees.
252. FLA. CO NST. art. 16, § 29, concerning the taking of property for public use
under eminent domain proceedings.
253. See note 249 supra.
254. This part of the decision relates specifically to that part of the legislation
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The court finally determined: (1) the legislature was not justified
in fixing a maximum amount of compensation that could be paid for the
destruction of non-infested trees;2 5  (2) that "just compensation" and
not "fair market value" was the proper measure of recovery; 250 (3) that
"just compensation" is a matter for judicial determination and not the
legislature; 257 (4) that summary taking under the police power is justi-
fied where there is an imminent danger to public health, safety, welfare
or morals, 258 and that such action is only subject to judicial review later,
but where there is no such immediate danger,2 9 then the due process
concept requires a notice and hearing before the taking;2 60 (5) that the
provision denying compensation for destroyed trees which were infested
but which had not yet shown any decline was invalid; 2M1 and, (6) that
the remainder of the act was valid.
2 62
Other eminent domain cases held: when a portion of land subject to
a mortgage is taken, the mortgagee is not entitled to the whole of the
award but only to a proportionate part by which his security is dimin-
ished;213 that loss by the owner of a drive-in theater to direct access to
a highway was not such a loss as to entitle him to compensation when
the highway was converted to a limited access facility;264 that where a
public corporation had a valid easement for the construction of canals,
no compensation need be paid servient owners upon the exercise of such
an easemen 25', and that the loss of access by boat to a nearby bay as
the result of the construction of a dawn was not the deprivation of a private
riparian right for which compensation need be paid.
266
providing compensation for the destruction of healthy, non-infested trees. No compensation
was provided for the destruction of infested trees whether healthy or not.
255. State Plant Board v. Smith, 110 So.2d 401, 407, 409 (Fla. 1959).
256. Id. at 406.
257. Id. at 407.
258. The court gave as examples: the destruction of diseased cattle, contaminated
food, obscene publications, fllicit intoxicants, narcotics, prohibited weapons, gambling
devices, and other property that menaces the public health, safety or morals.
259. It was noted that the burrowing nematode travels underground from one tree
to another at an average rate of 1.6 trees or 36 feet per year. There was thus no
imminenr danger of the spread of the disease from an infested to a non-infested grove.
260. 110 So.2d 401 at 408.
261. Id. at 408, 409.
262. Id. at 409.
263. Investors Syndicate of America v. Dade County, 98 So.2d 889 (Fla. App. 1958).
In this case approximately one tenth of the land was taken, and the court awarded the
mortgagee one tenth of the award.
264. Florida State Turnpike Authority v. Anhoco Corp., 107 So.2d 51 (Fla. App.
1958), modified, 114 So.2d 39 (Fla. App. 1959), to conform to a then unpublished
mandate of the supreme court. The court found that a strip of the owner's land was
taken, however, and ruled that recovery for such strip would have to be obtained in a
condemnation suit and not as ancillary relief in an injunction proceeding.
265. Central and So. Fla. Flood Control Dist. v. Dupuis, 105 So.2d 36 (Fla. App.
1958), aff'd, 109 So.2d 596 (Fla. App, 1959); Albury v. Central and So. Fa. Flood
Control Dist., 99 So.2d 248 (Fla. App. 1957).
266. Carmazi v, Board of County Commissioners of Dade County, 108 So.2d 318
(Fla. App. 1959), earlier report, 104 So,2d 727 (Fla. 1958).
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Eminent Domain, Damages. Many eminent domain cases dealt with
the proper measure of damages, and, of these, some were decided on
precedural matters. Thus, in Houk v. Dade County,267 an appeal from
an order refusing an allowance of attorney's fees incident to a prior appeal
was dismissed because of late filing, and, in Seban v. Dade County,
8
it was held not error for the trial judge to refuse to award attorney fees
following an appeal in which the property owner was successful since the
statute requires such fees to be determined by the jury. The procedure
by which the property owner may obtain a portion of the ultimate award
concomitant with the condemning authority's obtaining an immediate
title was clarified and delineated in State v. Vingfietd.201 It was therein
held that when the declaration of taking did not contain a statement of
the sum estimated by the condemning authorities to be just compensation
for the land taken, the trial judge was without power to adopt the value
fixed by the court appraisers as a basis of his discretionary power to make
a preliminary payment.
2 70
The fact that present zoning or other regulations restrict the taken
land to a particular use does not necessarily preclude evidence as to what
the value of the land would be if the restrictions should be changed to
permit other uses to which the land is better suited. The general rule
permits such value to be shown where there is a reasonable probability
of such a change.271 Evidence of such increased value was permitted where
the city by agreement with state officials had arbitrarily zfned land for
residential purposes so that the state could pay less when it finally decided
to acquire the land.272 Similarly, a property owner was allowed to show
the increased value of his land because of phosphate deposits although
mining was prohibited in the area at the time.
273
Other cases involving damages held: that the reasonable expenses of
an owner in relocating his business because of an insufficiency of land
remaining after condemnation proceedings may be recovered;27' that the
267. 97 So.2d 272 (Fla. 1957). The filing was late even if the notice were regarded
as a petition for certiorari and governed by the 60 day period instead of the thirty.
268. 102 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1958). In Burgin v. State Road Department, 98 So.2d
740 (Fla. 1957), recovery for damages was denied because the parties should have
appealed from the award received in a seond condemnation proceeding.
269. 101 So.2d 184 (Fla. App. 1958).
270. The court pointed out that the property owner should make timely objection
to the declaration if the condemning authority did not include such an estimate, and
also noted that such estimate is not submitted to the jury for any purpose. See 101 So.2d
184 at 187-188. for a more complete delineation of the proper procedure.
271. See the cases cited in notes 272-273 infra, and the supporting authority therein
cited.
272. Board of Comm'rs of State Institutions v. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 108
So. 2d 74 (Fla. App. 1959). Earlier proceedings are found in 101 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1958);
101 So.2d 411 (Fla. 1958); 100 So.2d 67 (Fla. App. 1958).
273. Swift & Co. v. llonsing Authority of Plant City, 106 So.2d 616 (Fla. App. 1958).




statute authorizing the recovery of damages to an established business five
years old when adjoining land was taken did not require that the present
owner had operated the business for such period, but that he was entitled
to such damages where the business qualified although the present owner
acquired it within the period;275 that an owner abutting a highway was
not entitled to damages resulting from the diversion of traffic to a new
road;270 that compensation should be measured by the value of the land
taken and not by the separate interests in the land; 7 that a grossly
inadequate award for attorney's fees may be set aside;278 and that a lessor
who leased a filling station was not entitled to loss of profits which might
be occasioned by the condemnation since it would be the lessee's retail
business which would suffer any such loss. 279 The case of State Road
Department of Florida v. Darby280 allowed recovery on the theory that
there was a taking where the department had prepared plans and super-
vised reconstruction of a road but had taken no steps to prevent the
deposit of clay, sand and silt on the plaintiff's land.
Tax Titles.281 The importance of ascertaining that all jurisdictional
requirements have been satisfied in the acquisition of a tax deed was
again emphasized in a number of cases which invalidated tax titles of
many years standing. In Ruyle v. Dolly,282 a tax title dating from 1907
was held invalid because the land was not subject to taxation when the
taxes were levied. Because of an erroneous survey, the land in question
was mistakenly located outside the bed of a navigable lake, and a private
chain of title initiated. Since the land in fact was under the lake, it was
sovereignty land,28 3 hence the original conveyance by the Board of
Education was invalid. Thus, the tax deed was invalid, and a subsequent
grantee from the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund in 1956, long
after the lake was drained, prevailed over a remote claimant under the tax
title.
Two Murphy tax titles were invalidated during the period of this
survey because of jurisdictional defects. In H. and H. Investment Company
275. Hooper v. State Road Dep't, 105 So.2d 515 (Fla. App. 1958).
276. Jahoda v. State Road Dep't, 106 So.2d 870 (Ila. App. 1958).
277. Dratch v. Dade County, 105 So.2d 171 (Ha. App. 1958).
278. Ibid.
279. City of Tampa v. Texas Co., 107 So.2d 216 (Fla. App. 1958), writ discharged,
109 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1959). Another basis for denial of the claim was that the taking
itself did not cause any damage to the remainder of the parcel, but such was caused
by the widening of the street and the lowering of the pavement. A number of other
issues were also involved, and the question of damages discussed at length.
280. 109 So.2d 591 (Fla. App. 1959). The damage may have been caused at least
in part by the default of a subcontractor. There was a dissent on the proposition that
the complaint sounded in tort and that the State Department was not responsible in tort.
281. See BoYER, FLORInA REA. ESTATE TRANSACTIONS ch. 31 (1959), for a
discussion of the various types of tax titles and suggested check lists for each type.
282. 110 So.2d 467 (Fla. App. 1959). See also the text accompanying note 81 supra
and note 283 infra.
283. See text, Submerged Sovereignty Land, following note 213 supra which also
contains a discussion of this case.
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v. Goldberg,"4 the tax assessments were held invalid because of faulty
description of the property, and the resulting certificates and forfeiture
of the land to the state were likewise held invalid. A similar result based
on the authority of this case was reached in Allison v. Rogero,285 which
also held that a faulty description in the assessment and tax certificate
rendered the resulting tax title a nullity.
The case of Fleming v. Hillsborough County8 6 involved a tax title
derived through county in rem proceedings.281 It was therein held that
incompetency of the taxpayer during pendency of the foreclosure suit
constituted no basis for relief or invalidation of the decree in the absence
of any provision in the statutes.28 8 Other cases held that failure of the
taxing officials to adhere to jurisdictional requirements afforded the
taxpayer the right to enjoin a tax sale,289 and that an easement for roadway
purposes, particularly where the tax deed expressly so stated, survived
the tax deed290
VI. MECuIANics' LIENS AND MORTGAGES
Mechanics' Liens - Legislation, Effective Date and Relation39' Several
sections of the Mechanics' Lien Law were amended by the 1959 Legis-
lature, the amendments relating primarily to the effective date of the
lien, the relation doctrine and priorities. Section 84.03 of the statutes
212
was amended to provide that after a default in construction and a sub-
sequent resumption, the liens of the subsequent lienors relate only to the
time work was resumed.29 3 This enactment appears to be a codification,
although differently expressed, of the dictum in Geiser v. Permacrete.
2914
This change in the wording of the statute necessitated other changes also.
Thus, section 84.16 was amended to provide that in the event of a default
of the original contractor, no claim or lien attaching prior to such default
shall be filed after three months from the date of default or from three
months after the final performance of labor or services or furnishing of
materials, whichever accrues first.29 5 Similarly, section 84.20 had to be
amended to conform to the new policy, and this section was changed to
read that mechanics' liens shall have priority over interests unrecorded at
284. 103 So.2d 682 (Fla. App. 1958).
285. 112 So.2d 578 (Fla. App. 1959).
286. 107 So.2d 162 (Fla. App. 1958).
287. These and other tax proceedings are discussed in BoyErR, op. cit. supra note 281,
ch. 31.
288. Fleming v. Hillsborotigh County, suo ra note 286.
289. A. L. Summers v. St, Joe Land and Dev. Co., 108 So.2d 54 (Fla. App. 1959).
290. Berger v. City of Coral Gables, 101 So.2d 396 (Fla. App. 1958).
291. See generally on the subject of the Florida Mechanics' Lien Law, Krasny, The
Florida Mechanics' Lien Act: Interpretation and Analysis of Selected Provisions, 14 U.
MIA1M L. Rrv. 73 (1959); BoVER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS ch 33 (1959).
292. F"A. STAT. § 84.03 (1957).
293. fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-460.
294. 90 So.2d 610 (Vla. 1956). The case is noted in Boyer, Ankus & Friedman,
Survey of Real Property Law, 12 U. MIAMI L. REV. 499, 529 (1958).
295. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-460.
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the time the lien attached?90 The change consisted in granting priority
to the lien over interests unrecorded at the time the lien attached rather
than over interests unrecorded at the time of visible commencement of
operations.
Section 84.0897 of the Law was also amended.298 This section relates
to the furnishing of affidavits, and now applies to any person, firm or
corporation, and not just to persons as formerly. The statute now makes
the furnishing of a false affidavit perjury if the one to whom it is furnished
parts with anything of value in reliance thereon. The requirements of
knowledge of the falsity and intent to defraud have been deleted.
Contractual Basis; Lessor's Interest. The basic proposition that a
mechanic's lien rests on contract was reaffirmed in a number of decisions
which denied the imposition of a lien on the estates or interests of persons
not participating, either expressly or by implication, in contracting for
the construction. Thus, in North Dade Plumbing, Inc. v. La Salle Bldg.
Corp.,299 it was held that a lienor basing his claim on construction ordered
by a tenant could not assert his lien against the landlord's fee interest when
the lease did not by its language or by implication provide for the con-
struction of an improvement. Similar results were reached in the cases of
Tom Joyce Realty Corp. v. Popkin"00 and Dills v. Tomoka Land Co.30'
The above cases did not overrule the earlier case of Anderson v,
Sokolik 30 2 which had subjected the lessor's interest to a mechanic's lien
under not greatly dissimilar circumstances. In that case, although the
lease did not specifically require or expressly authorize the construction
of any improvement, the court concluded that improvements were con-
templated and thus subjected the fee interest to the lien. The effect of
the recent decisions appears to be one of restricting the rationale of the
Sokolik case to its precise facts, or as the appellate courts have stated, to
those situations where the making of improvements on the leased land
"is the pith of the lease."3013 This seems desirable from a policy viewpoint
as there seems to be no compelling reason why the lienors should be
allowed claims against the property interests of others than those who
contracted for the improvements.
304
296. Ibid.
297. FLA. STAT. § 84.08 (1957).
298. Fla. Laws 1959, clh. 59-405.
299. 114 So.2d 707 (F'a. App. 1959).
300. 111 So2d 707 (Fla. App. 1959).
301. 108 So.2d 896 (Fla. App. 1959).
302. 88 So.2d 511 (Fia. 1956). The case is discussed in Boyer, Ankus & Friedman,
op. cit. supra note 294 at 528.
303. Tom Joyce Realty Corp. v. Popkin, 111 So.2d 707, 711 (Fla. App. 1959);
Dills v. Tomoka Land Co., 108 So.2d 896, 897 (Fla. 1959); Anderson v. Sokolik,
88 So.2d 511, 514 (Fla. 1956)
304. See the criticism of the Sokolik case in Boyer, Ankus & Friedman, op. cit. supra
note 294, and the cases cited in notes 299-301 supra limiting the doctrine.
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Two other cases also recognized the necessity of privity between the
lienor and lienee. In Grossman v. Pollock,30° an architect was employed
by a proposed lessee. The lease was placed in escrow conditioned upon
the procurement of construction funds. The proposed lessee could not
secure the funds, hence the lease never became operative, and the archi-
tect was accordingly denied a lien against the land. In Carolina Lumber
Co. v. Daniel,306 the chancellor's determination, based upon conflicting
evidence, was upheld to the effect that a contractor making certain repairs
was not an agent of the owners but an independent contractor, that the
materialman relied solely on that person's credit, and hence was denied
a materialman's lien.
The statutory agency of non-separated spouses was recognized and
upheld in Meadows Southern Constr. Co. v. Pezzanti.30 7 In this case, a
wife's interest in an estate by the entireties was subjected to a mechanic's
lien when the work was contracted solely by the husband, but the wife
under such circumstances could not be held personally liable, and hence
could not be subjected to a deficiency decree.
Federal Tax Liens, Priorities. The case of U. S. v. Griffin-Moore
Lumber Co., ' according priority to a mechanic's lien over a subsequently
filed federal tax lien, has apparently been overruled by the United States
Supreme Court in U. S. v. Hulley.309 The Hulley case reversed the State
Supreme Court3'0 which had accorded priority to a mechanic's lien recorded
after the recordation of the federal tax lien, but which mechanic's lien
related back under Florida law to the visible commencement of the
work. 11 The state decision was reversed on the basis of federal decisions
arising in other jurisdictions." 2 It appears that under the federal deci-
sions, which are of course, controlling, a tax lien is given priority over a
mechanic's lien, whether recorded or not, unless the mechanic's lien
is reduced to a judgment before the federal lien attaches.313 It is probable
305. 100 So.2d 660 (Fla. App. 1958).
306. 97 So.2d 156 (Fla. App. 1957).
307. 108 So.2d 499 (Fla. App. 1959). The statutory agency is found in FLA. ST.vr.
§ 84.12 (1957).
308. 62 So.2d 589 (Fla. 1953).
309. 358 U.S. 66 (1958).
310. Gulf Beach Bank v. hulley, 102 So.2d 599, 2 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 5889
(Tia. 1958), affirming, 2 Am. Fed, Tax R. 2d 5886 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Pinellas Cty. 1956).
See note 309 supra, for reversal.
311. Griffin.Moore and Ifulley are thus distinguishable. In Griffin-Moore the
mechanic's lien was recorded before the federal tax lien. In Hulley the federal tax lien
was recorded first, but the mechanic's lien related back under the state law. The federal tax
lien becomes effective on assessment and does not depend on recording. See 26
U.S.C.A. § 6322 (1955). For further discussion, see the references in note 313 infra.
312. E.g., United States v. Colotta, 350 U.S. 808, reversing 79 So.2d 474 (Miss.
1955); United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956), reversing
227 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1955).
313. This whole problem is discussed more fully in BORER, FLORIDA R., E sTATE
TRANS.CTIONS § 34.15(4) (1959). See the amusing discussion of the federal requirement
of "choateness" to entitle the state lien to priority in 42 A.B.A.I. 608 (1956).
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that federal legislation will at least formalize the rules of priority.814
Progress Payments and Major Improvements. Two cases involved
the determination of proper payment in contracts calling for progress
payments where the -cost of improvements exceed $3,000. Under these
circumstances, where no bond is furnished, the statute requires the owner
to withhold 20% of each payment, and in no event to pay more than
80% under the contract until it has been fully performed, final payment
is due, and the contractor has furnished the required sworn statement.
31 5
In Flood v. Clark,'"6 the contract between the builder and developers
required the developers to withhold 30% of the price for the final pay-
ment. It was accordingly held that this written contract prevailed, that it
could not be modified by a subsequent parol agreement to withhold only
20%,a1T and accordingly the lienors were entitled to liens to the extent
of 30% of the contract price and not just to 20%.
The case of Sinclair Refining Co. v. J. H. Cobb, Inc., 18 also involving
progress payments, decided that the owner had proceeded properly until
the final payment. In this case, the contract provided that the progress
payments would constitute 80% of the value of the work completed to
date. The owner made payments accordingly, and at the time for final
payment had actually 24% of the total contract price unpaid. The trial
court had held that the owner was required to withhold 20% of the 80%
stipulated payments, but this was reversed on appeal. The District Court
of Appeal stated that to follow the interpretation of the trial court would
require a withholding of 36% of the total contract price in the instant
case, and concluded the purpose of the statute was accomplished by the
progress payments of 80% of the completed value. 19 The case appears
sound. It does show, however, the ambiguity in the statute which requires
a withholding of 20% of each progress payment and a payment of no more
than 80% of the total price until the work is completed and all statutory
requirements satisfied.
Perfection of Lien. A number of cases dealt with various aspects
of other requirements for the perfection of liensY320 A lienor's failure to serve
314. See Tax Law Notes, 33 FLA. BJ. 1080 1959), referring to proposed legislation
introduced in both the House and Senate in 1959. This legislation is 11.R. 7914 and
I.R. 7915 in the House, and S. 2305 in the Senate.
315. FLA. STAT. § 84.05(11)(a) (1957).
316. 11 So.2d 465 (Fla. App. 1959).
317. The project was a cooperative apartment house, and the escrow agreement with
the apartment purchasers also stipulated for the 30% retention. The court pointed out
also that the developers could not change this contract without the consent of the owners
or purchasers of the various apartments.
318. 112 So.2d 582 (Fla. App. 1959).
319. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. 1. H. Cobb, Inc., supra note 318.
320. Stone Arts v. Dwyer, 99 So.2d 880 (Fla. App. 1958). See also Boyer, Ankus &
Friedman, Survey of Real Property Law, 12 U. MIAMi L. REv. 499, 528 (1958), for
earlier cases on this problem.
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a cautionary notice was held no bar to the acquisition of a lien in the
absence of the owner's obtaining a sworn statement from the contractor.
"2t
Although a claimant dealing directly with an owner perfects his lien by
the performance of labor or the supplying of material,3 22 such lien may
be lost as to purchasers and creditors: (1) when rights are acquired more
than three months after the final performance of the labor or services
or the final furnishing of the materials when no claims have been filed
as provided; or (2) when acquired before the three months has run and no
claim of lien is filed within the three months, and no suit to enforce the
lien is commenced within the three months. -"2 Thus, a grantee from a
builder-owner took free of liens for which claims had been filed more
than three months after furnishing the last materials or labor.324
The determination of whether a particular claimant was a contractor
or subcontractor was the controlling issue in Pope v. Carter.325 The
claimant in this ease had supplied fill dirt and graded the properties. He
contended that the owners were improving the property as their own
contractors, and that he was a subcontractor and therefore did not have to
furnish a sworn statement in order to be entitled to a lien. The court
concluded, however, that under the facts the claimant was a contractor
dealing with the defendants as owners, and, thercfore, was required to
furnish the statement, so that he presumably lost the lien because he
did not furnish it within a year.
Mortgages; Legislation. A 1959 statute3 20 requires a printed or rubber
stamp special notation on "balloon" mortgages. The act also defines
"balloon" mortgages, 82 7 provides for certain exceptions, and exacts the
penalty of forfeiting interest as well as extending the date of maturity
in case of violation.
Deeds Absolute As Mortgages. Three cases during the period of
this survey involved the issue of whether certain deeds absolute should
be construed as mortgages.. In two instances 2" the allegations were sus-
321. Gulf Stream Lumber Co. v. Lathrop, 108 So.2d 55 (Fla. App. 1959). The
court permitted the materialman a lien for materials furnished subsequent to the release
or receipted bill, however.
322. Thus, no claim of lien need be filled, Nathman v. Chrycy, 107 So.2d 782, 784
(Fla. App. 1959); BoynR, FLaQ3A REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 33.14 n. 2 for many
case citations.
323. Nathman v. Chrycy, infra note 324.
324. Nathman v. Chrycy, 107 So.2d 782 (Fla. App. 1959); Gray v. L. M. Penzi
Tile Co., 107 So.2d 621 (Fla. App. 1959). Liens were also denied to one furnishing
material to a plasterer who was a contractor with the owner because it was not shown that
the plasterer had not been paid in full at the time of filing the claim of lien,
325. 102 So.2d 658 (Fla. App. 1958).
326. Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-356.
327. "Every mortgage in which the final payment or the balance due and payable
upon maturity is greater than twice the amount of the regular monthly or periodic
payment of the said mortgage shall be deemed a balloon mortgage." Fla. Laws 1959,
ch. 59-356, § 2.
328. Kinney v. Mosher, 100 So.2d 644 (Fla. App. 1958); Erstling v. Trinity




tained, and in the other 29 the contention was denied, the court concluding
therein that the deed was given in satisfaction of the debt and not as
security therefor.330 In Kinney v. Mosher, 3 ' a husband and wife purchased
a piece of realty as tenants by the entireties. They shortly afterwards
conveyed it to the husband's brother and sister-in-law to secure a previous
temporary loan of $10,000. Later, the brother and sister-in-law conveyed
the property back to the husband alone. On the subsequent death of the
husband, a dispute arose as to the rights of the deceased's children under
the homestead law. It was held that the deed conveying the land was in
fact for the purpose of securing the loan, and hence was a mortgage, and
that the reconveyance to the husband was in reality a satisfaction of the
mortgage. Thus, the surviving widow was entitled to the entire realty as
surviving tenant by the entireties, and the homestead descent provisions
were inapplicable.
3 32
In Toner v. Hubbard,333 also involving the question of construing a deed
as a mortgage, the grantor joined by his wife, conveyed certain realty to
his attorneys in return for the cancellation of two previous mortgages
given to secure the payment of legal fees, cancellation of an additional
$200 indebtedness, and $400 in cash. The grantor was also given a written
option to repurchase within a year, which option had not been exer-
cised.33 4 Five and one half years later Edwards (the original grantor),
conveyed the land subject to the alleged mortgage indebtedness, and the
grantee filed suit. The court concluded that the deed was in fact a deed
absolute and not a mortgage and that it had been given in satisfaction
of the debt. It was also concluded that the fact that the grantees were
the attorneys for the grantor did not render the transaction voidable in
the absence of bad faith, over-reaching, undue influence or other inequit-
able conduct.335
Mortgages, Miscellaneous. In two cases raising the issue of considera-
tion, it was found in one336 that the mortgage was based on consideration
and hence was not invalid for that reason; while in the other,337 it was held
that an agreement to refund interest on prepayment of the mortgage was
329. Toner v. Hubbard, 105 So.2d 180 (Fla. App. 1958), cert. denied, 109 So.2d
168 (Fla. 1959).
330. The transaction is a mortgage if there is a debt between the parties and the deed
is given as security therefor. If the debt is extinguished, however, it is not a mortgage.
See BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE IRANSACTIONS 1003-1004 (1959).
331. 100 So.2d 644 (Fla. App. 1958).
332. See text accompanying note 151 supra for a discussion of this aspect of the case.
333. 105 So.2d 180 (Fla. App. 1958), cert. denied, 109 So.2d 168 (Fla. 1959).
334. For an explanation of conditional sales see BOYER, op. cit. supra note 330, at
1004,
335. Toner v. Hubbard, supra note 333.
336. Beck v. Hodge, 101 So.2d 47 (Fla. App. 1958). Questions of usury and agency
were not decided.
337. Casa Marina Hotel Co. v. Barnes, 105 So.2d 204 (Fla. App. 1958).
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not supported by consideration and hence was unenforceable. In cases
involving assignments, it was held in one 88 that a mortgagor is not
entitled to settle with the holder of the note and mortgage where he knows
that there is an assignment of a part interest, and, in another,8' 9 that
an assignee of the mortgage was not entitled to recover from the mort-
gagors an overpayment by the mortgagee when the plaintiff failed to
show a right to the claim.
In several cases involving foreclosures, it was held: that it was no
abuse of the trial court's discretion to deny the right of intervention to
a creditor pending his appeal in another suit wherein he was seeking to
set aside the mortgage;340 that the court properly protected an unreleased
dower interest by retaining one-third of the proceeds of the foreclosure
sale pending assignment of dower by the county judge's court, and that
such dower interest was not chargeable with attorney's fees;341 that the
original mortgagor is not a necessary party in a foreclosure action where
no deficiency decree is asked;842 and that where two separate mortgages
securing two separate notes executed on different properties are being
foreclosed, the proceeds shall not be intermingled but that the distinct
rights of the parties under the two transactions shall be maintained, with
the costs and attorney's fees being apportioned.
43
The acceleration clause in the mortgage controls over a similar clause
in the note where the mortgage clause expressly so provides,344 and an
unwitnessed mortgage is unenforceable against the homestead.3 45 A mort-
gage was set aside in one case348 where there was fraud in the procurement
and the assignee was found to take with notice because he acquired his
interest after default and at a substantial discount. It has been held error
338. Kaufman v. Bernstein, 100 So.2d 801 (Fla. 1958). The court also pointed
out that since the mortgagor had owned only a half interest, it was error to order the
property sold in its entirety. Only an undivided one half interest should be sold in such
circumstances.
339. Washington v. Independent Realty Co., 99 So.2d 613 (Fla. 1958). The court
also concluded that the action was not a proper one for declaratory decree.
340. Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Morales, 101 So.2d 900 (Fla. App. 1958).
341. Wax v. Wilson, 101 So.2d 54 (Fla. App. 1958). See text accompanying note
134 for another aspect of the case.
342. Rubin v. Kapell, 105 So.2d 28 (Fla. App. 1958). The court noted that a
deficiency decree could be granted under a prayer for general relief, but said that such
a complaint would not authorize a deficiency decree against one not a party to the suit,
particularly where it is a dissolved corporation. It was also noted that a complainant is
not compelled to submit the adjudication of a deficiency decree to a court of equity.
343. Browning v. Bank of Lake Alfred, 101 So.2d 898 (Fla. App. 1958).
344. Mager v. Abrams, 109 So. 2d 386 (Fla. App. 1958).
345. Perry v. Beckerman, 97 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1957), amended decree rev'd on other
grounds, 106 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1958). See also text accompanying notes 14-21 and
141 subra.
346. Meyerson v. Boyce, 97 So.2d 488 (Fla. App. 1957). The mortgagors were
illiterates who were told that their property would be improved without charge for
advertising purposes, and they were induced to sign the note and mortgage under
representations that it was a contract authorizing the work for advertising purposes.
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to refer a whole foreclosure proceeding to an examiner irrespective of a
crowded docket, when one of the parties objects 34T
Satisfaction by Merger; Incompetence; and Estoppel by Record. The
contention of satisfaction by merger was rejected in the factually interesting
case of Miami Gardens v. Conway.' 3 In this case there was a first and
second mortgage followed by a default on the first mortgage. The mort-
gagors thereupon executed a deed in blank to the first mortgagee and
vacated the premises. The mortgagee then secured a buyer for the premises
and, upon learning of the second mortgage, brought an action of fore-
closure. The second mortgagee contended the first mortgage was satisfied
and sought foreclosure of his own mortgage as a first mortgage. The court
stated that the deed executed without the name of the grantee was a
nullity, and, therefore, there was no merger of the legal and equitable
title,349 and hence no satisfaction of the first mortgage. It stated, however,
that a mortgagee in possession prior to foreclosure had a duty to account,
and this duty extended to junior incumbrances, for the net rents and
profits during the possession, actual or constructive, of the mortgagee.350
In Machtei Y. Campbell,35' the principal issue was the validity of a
mortgage executed by an incompetent during a brief period of restoration
and pending further incompetency proceedings. It was held proper to
cancel the mortgage even as against an innocent transferee and holder in
due course of the note, but that to the extent the incompetent received
consideration, the holder could enforce the obligation.
In Welbourn v. Cohen,52  the mortgaged property was purchased
subject to a leasehold estate, a purchase money mortgage given, and then
the mortgagors acquired a sublease in the same premises. After fore-
closure, the mortgagors refused to deliver possession contending that the
lien of the mortgage on the fee did not automatically attach to the sub-
leasehold. The court refused to pass on "the interesting legal questions,"
pointing out that all the parties were before the trial court and that the
decree barred the mortgagors from all right, title and interest. Since the
mortgagors did not argue the point during the initial litigation, or at
any rate, did not appeal from the decree, they were estopped by record,
and the writ of assistance was proper.
347. Powell v. Weger, 97 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1957). There was one dissent on
rehearing. The similarity and difference between a special master and an examiner
were also delineated.
348. 102 So.2d 622 (Fla. 1958).
349. These points are also noted in the text accompanying notes 91 and 92 sura.
350. The possession of the vendee was regarded as the possession of the mortgagee,
and "net rents and profits" were construed to mean the reasonable rental value of the
premises less the costs of maintenance, taxes, and other proper charges. Miami Gardens v.
Conway, 102 So.2d 622, 626-628 (Fla. 1958).
351. 102 So.2d 722 (Fla. 1958).
352. 104 So.2d 383 (Fla. App. 1958). For other aspects of the litigation between
these parties, see text accompanying note 51 supra.
1960]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
VII. LANDLORD AND TENANT"""
Options; Per petuities and Other Problems. Florida became aligned
during the period of this survey with the majority American viewpoint
that options in leases do not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. As
this problem has already been discussed, 54 other matters relating to
options will be considered at this time.
Inl Markos v. Rainondi,'5  it was reaffirmed that an option to purchase
normally constitutes a covenant running with the land and inures to an
assignee of the leasehold. Although ain exception is recognized in case the
lessor relies on the personal confidence of the lessee as may be the case
if the transaction is to be accomplished partly on credit, this defense
cannot be asserted if the lessor bases his refusal to convey on other
grounds. 350 Another aspect of the case dealt with the problem of expiration
of the option, and the court concluded that it had not expired and
therefore affirmed the decree of specific performance. 5
7
Options accorded the lessee are also enforceable against purchasers
of the reversion from the lessor unless they are bona fide purchasers without
notice, and this proposition was reaffirmed in Deneo, Inc. v. Belk.3 -18 The
case also noted that possession by the tenant normally constitutes notice
of the lease and all of its contents, and stated that it was no defense to
the tenant's action that the amount allocable to the property in question
was uncertain when the difficulty was occasioned by the purchaser's own
conduct in purchasing several properties for one lump sum payment.83 9
A possible distinction between an option to renew and an option to
extend was again denied in Sisco v. Rotenberg.10  Lease provisions govern-
ing the exercise of options are naturally controlling. Thus, it was held that
where a clause provided that the option should remain in effect for a
stated time measured from the execution of the lease, the time was not
extended by an indorsement that the leaschold should begin at a later
date . 61 Accordingly, an attempted exercise within the period of the lease
as extended but beyond the period measured from the execution of the
lease was too late. ,1 2
The proper construction of a lessor's option to terminate was one
of the principal issues in Mann v. Thompson,38 3 which utilized the
353. Tort cases are omitted.
354. See the text accompanying notes 130-133 supra.
355. 108 So.2d 506 (Fla. App. 1959).
356. Ibid,
357. Ibid.
358. 97 So.2d 261 (Fla. 1957), and 109 So.2d 201 (Fla. App. 1959).
359. The option was in the form of a first refusal if the lessor should decide to sell
during the term of the lease. After sale by the landlord, the tenant brought an action
against the purchaser.
360. 104 So.2d 365 (Fla. 1958). Other aspects of the case are discussed ill text
accompanying note 130 supra.
361. F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co. v. Beauchamp, 101 So.2d 398 (Fla. App. 1958).
362. Ibid.
363. 100 So.2d 634 (Fla. App. 1958).
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principle of ejusdem generis to limit the lessor's discretion. It was therein
stated that the use of the words "for any other reason," preceded by
specific reasons such as sale of the lands or need by the lessor for pasture,
restricted the lessor's right to terminate to reasons related to those
specified. 54
Security Deposits. A number of cases concerning the rights of the
respective parties to security deposits arose during the period of this survey.
Kanter v. Safran,1 made its third appearance 3 1 before the Supreme Court,
the chief issue this time being the amount of damages the lessors were
entitled to retain from the security deposit, the period of the original lease
having expired. 67 Ti court held that the fact that the lessor had sold
the premises before the expiration of the lease term did not necessarily
render it impossible to ascertain damages, but the burden of proof was
on the lessors, and on the basis of the record presented, it was not error
to refuse to allow a setoff for general damages?68s
In Hayes v. Cameron,0 9 the tenant had deposited a sum of money
which was to be paid back to him in six monthly installments to run con-
currently with the rental payments due for the last six months of the term.
On assignment of the lease, the tenant specifically assigned the benefit
of the security deposit to the assignee relying on reimbursement by having
the assignee make the "rental payments" for the last six months to the
assignor. Sometime later the assignee and the lessors surrendered the
leasehold by mutual agreement. In holding that the original tenant was
not entitled to recover the security deposit from the lessors, the court
stated that the terms of the assignment evidenced an intent of the lessee
to look only to his assignee for recovery of the money. In Hirsch v.
Covey,370 the lessee recovered the balance of the security deposit after the
364. The case also involved specific performance of a new lease. In denying the
remedy, the court concluded, among a number of reasons, that the parties did not
intend to consummate the agreement before all the terms and conditions had been fully
determined and formalized in a written document.
365. 99 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1958), earlier reports, infra note 366.
366. See earlier reports, Kanter v. Safran, 68 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1953), and 82 So.2d
508 (Fla. 19551.
367. This litigation undoubtedly constitutes a landmark exposition of much of the
Florida law on such landlord-tenant problems as surrender by operation of law, anticipatory
breach of lease, and rights of the parties to the security deposits, In 68 So.2d 553 (Fla.
1953), containing the most comprehensive exposition of these general principles, it was
held that since the agreement for retention of security deposit was a stipulation for
a penalty rather than liquidated damages, the rights of the parties could not be
determined until expiration of the lease period. In 82 So.2d 508 (Fla. 1955), it was
held that the lessor's renting for a period longer than the original lease did not necessarily
show an intent to abandon resumption of the premises as agent of the tenant and to
hold him for any losses resulting from such re-renting. The litigation is noted in
previous survey articles: 12 U. Mlmi L. Rzv. 499, 530-531, (19581; 10 NITANM L.Q.
383 (1956).
368. Kanter v. Safran, 99 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1958). The court affirmed the finding
as to special damages.
369. 101 So.2d 45 (Fla. App. 1958).
370. 111 So.2d491 (Fla. App. 1959).
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lessor's damages were deducted, the principal point of dispute being the
amount of damages to which the lessor was entitled.
Miscellaneous Problems and Constnction of Particular Provisions. A
lease of hotel space for operation of a medical clinic precipitated the liti-
gation in Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v, Kaplan87 wherein the lessee doctor
contended that he had the exclusive right to maintain a medical office
or clinic on the premises, and that the hotel breached this right in leasing
space to another doctor. The court concluded that the terms of the lease
did not give such all exclusive right to the doctor, but that other provisions
of the lease, requiring the hotel or its employees to refer inquiring guests
to the tenant doctor, were breached, and that the plaintiff doctor was
entitled to all injunction and damages.
In Parkleigh House v. Wahl,372 the tenant also contended an exclusive
right to conduct a certain type of business and sought to enjoin the lessor
from renting to a competitor. This exclusive right was based on oral repre-
sentations, there being no such provision in the lease, and the court, in
denying relief to the tenant, relied on the proposition that verbal agreements
cannot vary the terms of a lease as subsequently reduced to writing in
the absence of fraud, deception, mistake or overreaching.
The imposition of a vendor's lien on the sale and transfer of the
tenant's business and lease was recognized in Oliver v. Mercaldi.378 At the
time of the transaction, the assignor received a chattel mortgage which
did not include the lease although the assignees represented that it would
by implication. The court refused to reform the mortgage so as to include
the leasehold, but imposed a vendor's lien instead, and enforced it against
a subsequent transferee with notice. A chattel mortgage did include the
leasehold in another case,81 4 but the lease was subsequently cancelled in
a judicial action in which the assignees of the mortgage and final fore-
closure decree were joined.
The settlement of accounts between the lessor and lessee of a hotel
required judicial aid in National Hotel v. Koretzky.375 The lease provided
that the tenant should return the personal property included in the trans-
action in as good a condition as when received, reasonable wear and tear,
natural depreciation and obsolescence excepted. The dispute arose as to
missing items, whether the tenant should be allowed a depreciation credit
371. 108 So.2d 503 (Fla. App. 1959).
372. 97 So.2d 714 (Fla. App. 1957).
373. 103 So.2d 665 (Fla. App. 1958).
374. E. J. Smith Co. v. Van Straaten, 106 So.2d 226 (Fla. App. 1958).
375. 96 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1957), aff'd, 98 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1957). In Macina v.
Magurno, 100 So.2d 369 (Fla. 1958), the sufficiency of the audit furnished by the
lessee and by which additional renLtal payments were calculated constituted the principal
basis of dispute. It was held that the affirmative defenses of waiver, laches and estoppel
precluded the rendering of a summary judgment.
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or charged at actual replacement cost. The court concluded that the tenant
was entitled to a depreciation allowance.376
Taxation of leasehold. A leasehold is not taxable in Florida either as
real or personal, tangible or intangible property according to Park-N-Shop,
Inc. v. Sparkman.-3 7 In this case a county leased certain land for com-
mercial use and provided that no ad valorem real estate taxes (county or
city), should be levied. In upholding the validity of the tax exempt pro-
visions, the court concluded that the property of the state and counties
were immune rather than exempt from taxation. Hence, the county and
city were powerless to tax such land in any event regardless of any provi-
sions in the lease. Similarly, they were powerless to tax the interest as
tangible or intangible property since the taxing statutes did not include
leaseholds.
Interference With Tenant's Use of The Premises. The case of Young
v. Cobbs378 made its second appearance, 379 the principal issue this time
being the amount of recovery by the tenant for the landord's eviction.380
It was previously held that he could not recover for loss of profits as they
were too speculative since the business was being conducted in a "ghost
townj." '38' However, this decision held he was entitled to recover for the
permanent improvements since they were necessary expenditures and the
tenant had expected to use the premises for the full term. He should be
entitled to recover for the loss of their use for the unexpired term, but if
he should be able to secure another location where such improvements
were already installed, this fact could be considered.
In another case,38 2 the finding of a wrongful termination was affirmed,
but the case was reversed because of excessive damages, the court referring
to the first Cobbs case as delineating the proper measure of recovery.
In Carner v. Shapiro,3813 the landlord's renovation of the second floor
of a building interefered with a tenant's business. The repairs were
virtually completed at the time of final hearing, hence the chancellor
376. The court also noted that a common law arbitration award may be attacked on
the ground that the arbitrators erroneously applied rules of law, while a statutory award
may be set aside only on grounds of fraud, corruption, gross negligence or misbehavior.
It was held error to set aside the award in the instant case since the abitrators proceeded
correctly. National Hotel v. Koretzky, 96 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1957), aff'd, 98 So.2d
803 (Fla. 1957).
377. 99 So.2d 571 (Fla. 1958).
378. 110 So.2d 651 (Fla. 1959). See note 379 infra, for earlier decision.
379. The earlier case is 83 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1955).
380. The eviction consisted of the landlord's padlocking the plaintiff's store.
381. Young v. Cobbs, 83 So.2d 417, 419 (Fla. 1955), and stating that this was an
exception to the usual rule. Actually, the location was an unsuccessful and abandoned
shopping center, the plaintiff being the sole sunviving tenant at the time of the eviction.
382. Smith v. Designers Industries, Inc., 109 So.2d 776 (Fla. App. 1959). The
dissenting opinion questions the wrongful eviction, and indeed no evidence is stated
showing such wrongful conduct on the part of the landlord. See 109 So.2d 776 at 777.
383. 106 So.2d 87 (Fla. App. 1958).
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'denied an injunction but awarded damages. This action was affirmed
oi appeal.
Remedies of the Landlord. In Wagner v. Rice,384 the lease called
for a stipulated annual guaranteed minimum rental to be paid in advance
with additional paymeits based on the number of tomato crates packed.
The lessee refused to make the third guaranteed payment, and the lessor
recovered possession of the premises by an action in the county court.
Thereafter, the lessor brought action to recover double rent, including
'the omitted guaranteed payment, for the period of the holdover. The
court first concluded that the landlord had no right to recover double
rent since the statutory penalty" 5 was construed to apply only to expiration
of the lease by passage of time and not to termination for other reasons.
The court then concluded that the lessor had elected to terminate the
lcase on the tenant's breach and considered the claim for rent under
the circumstances. It was held that a lawful eviction by the landlord
does not affect his right to rents accrued under the lease, and that the
fact that payments were to be made in advance is immaterial. Thus, the
landlord was entitled to the past due guaranteed annual rental plus interest.
The case of Placid York Co. v. Calvert Hotel Co. 80 involved the
time for appeal in a summary eviction proceeding. It was therein held
that in counties such as Dade, which have no county court, that the
time for appeal from the civil court of record in these cases is governed
by section 83.27 (two days), and not by section 83.38 (ten days), which
is applicablc to appeals from the county court. Thus, an appeal filed
three days after the denial of a motion for new trial was too late.
The case of Concrete Block 65 Wall Co. v. Kna p8 7 sought to set
aside a judgment in a distress proceeding and also damages. The court
briefly reviewed the nature of distress and noted that seizure of the
tenant's chattels on the leased land may be a sufficient invoking of
jurisdiction, but concluded fhat Under the facts of service in the case
the tenant corporation must have been apprised of the proceedings.
Thus, it was held the judgment was not subject to collateral attack, and
that the landlord purchased the distrained property for a very small sum
did not give the tenant a cause of action. If additional property not
covered by the warrant were appropriated and sold, it would constitute
conversion, but this would not entitle the tenant to equitable relief
since his remedy would be an action at law. 88
384. 97 So.2d 267 (Ila, 1957).
385. FLA. STAT. § 83.06 (1957).
386. 109 So.2d 604 (Fla. App.). cert. denied, 114 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1959).
387. 102 So.2d 742 (Fla. App. 1958).
388. The landlord's remedies of distress, forciblc entry and detainer, and snummary
eviction proceedings are discussed at length in BoYER, FLORIDA RE, ESTATE IRAN-
sAC[IONS ch. 37 (1959).
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